In the past, insurance companies and pension funds have been keen to advertise the benefit of compounding arithmetic for savings. Over the last 30 or 40 years the rate has been lifted by inflation, but to understand the cost inflation brings you have to consider the whole savings cycle: not just the accumulation stage, but also annuity values in retirement. Furthermore, the historical experience of a typical working life should be compared with a theoretical sound-money alternative.
Let us assume a man works for 40 years, during which time he invests a fixed amount annually. This is invested mostly in bonds for a return that gives him a lump sum on retirement. The marketing folk stop at that point, but we shall go on. This lump sum is applied to an annuity to give a fixed income for the retiree’s life expectancy. Let us also assume that $1,000 is invested annually, and we shall use the average return on the 10-year US Treasury bond as our yardstick. The result is shown in the table below under the heading of Paper Money.
Paper Money
Sound Money
Annual payment at start of period $
1,000
1,000
Bond yield
7.18%
2.50%
Inflation
4.44%
-1%
Nominal value at end of Year 40 $
224,150
69,088
Inflation adjusted value $
74,056
87,510
Pension based on inflation-adjusted value $
6,458
4,750
Inflation-adjusted value of last payment $
2,075
6,091
The nominal value of our pension-pot on retirement is an attractive $224,150, but during its accumulation price inflation has averaged 4.44%, so its inflation-adjusted value is only $74,056, implying that the difference ($150,094) is a hidden inflation tax, leaving our saver with only one-third of his savings in real terms.
Assuming the lump sum is then turned into an annuity at a continuing bond yield of 7.18% for a retirement of 25 years, this inflation-adjusted figure gives an annual income of $6,458, and if inflation continues to average the historic rate, the final payment will only be worth $2,075 in inflation-adjusted terms. Note how the purchasing power of the annuity falls over time while our retiree’s health and care expenses can be expected to increase when he can least afford them.
The reason for taking inflation out of the equation is so we can compare the inflationary past with a sound-money alternative. This calculation is dramatically different under the reasonable assumptions in the table’s last column: an average bond yield of 2.5% and price deflation of 1% annually. The deflation-adjusted outcome is significantly better than the paper-money example. Furthermore, the purchasing power of the annuity increases, in tune with the health and care needs of an aging retiree.
Our example is simplistic: bond yields have varied hugely since 1971, and we have ignored management fees and taxes. We have not considered bond yields that are exceptionally low today, so annuities taken out now will yield considerably less than our example shows.
The bottom line is the saver is impoverished by inflation to a greater extent than generally realised. The state has benefited from the transfer of wealth from its citizens’ savings, the result of monetary inflation, but at considerable future cost. The state is left with the welfare, health and care costs for an aging population unable to support itself and with an increasing life expectancy.
The cost of looking after growing numbers of impoverished retirees will become apparent in coming years, increasing government deficits more rapidly than expected. What we don’t know is when the markets will reflect the enormity of these future obligations.
This article was previously published at GoldMoney.com.
The most important objective for any government is to achieve economic growth. Out of this growth develops employment and taxes to fund government itself. It is in other words the primary focus of all economic planning. Much effort is also spent perfecting the statistics deemed vital to quantifying everything that might contribute to the attainment of this end. Furthermore, “independent” monetary policy long ago migrated from the principal objective of controlling inflation to stimulating the economy into more growth. Almost everyone in developed economies knows and supports this objective, even if they argue over the means. However, not only have governments consistently failed to achieve this fundamental objective, they are now increasingly worried that government spending cuts will propel us all into a deep economic contraction.
But are we right to think in terms of economic growth or contraction? The concept is essentially Keynesian and stems from mainstream economic analysis. It presupposes that governments actually have a positive interventionist role and can improve economic outcomes, a supposition that is on examination completely flawed. Instead, an economy that successfully delivers the products and services people actually want does so in an unplanned, random fashion. It is the sum of all activity, which organises the production of goods and services by entrepreneurs and business proprietors in the considered belief they will be wanted.
The strength behind a free-market economy is the randomness of productive actions, and progress of mankind’s condition is the result. It only expands if the factors of production expand; otherwise the distribution of available resources depends on entrepreneurial anticipation of people’s needs and wants. When government intervenes in this unplanned but productive chaos it destroys this random quality, harnessing economic actions into in a common direction.
Destructive cycles of boom and bust have always been the result. Governments seek to co-ordinate randomness for an outcome they commonly call growth, and for a short time they might appear to succeed. But it is not long before these co-ordinated economic actions inevitably drive up prices, because extra factors of production (raw materials, labour and capital goods) only become available at higher price levels. Higher prices inevitably lead to higher interest rates, to the point where those who have fallen for the bait of artificially cheapened credit have to cut and take their losses. Capital theory predicts this outcome, events always confirm it, yet mainstream economists continually ignore it[i].
Intervention is as likely to succeed as water is to run uphill. Economic growth or the lack of it, the success or failure by which it is measured, is its child. The question then arises as to whether or not we can have economic growth without intervention.
The logical answer is no. A free-market economy in the absence of external factors does not grow: it progresses, which is a very different thing. It discards those things consumers do not want and produces things they are likely to want. It adjusts the price of products to a level which satisfies the consumer and is at the same time profitable. Overproduction is punished and underproduction invites competition. No one knows what the consumers will buy tomorrow or how much they are prepared to pay, but randomly-acting entrepreneurs are generally pretty good at guessing, because they put their own time and money on the line. They have to anticipate levels of demand and also prices for their output for at least as far in advance as it takes to plan, produce and market any product. This is progress, not growth. Progress is about better products and services tomorrow than today, using the resources actually available. Progress is about better value for money tomorrow, which means that prices tend to fall. And as prices tend to fall, more things can be bought for the same money. What governments do instead is destroy this process of progression in an attempt to replace it with statistical growth.
The statistics devised to measure it, principally gross domestic product, cannot measure anything other than the money in the productive economy, which it does imperfectly. Government spending, which is an economic cost, is included pari-passu with valued production. Efficient producers such as the manufacturers and suppliers of electronic goods and services, who reduce their prices over time, see their output diminished as a proportion of the statistical whole, while those that maintain their prices by monopolistic or subsidised means keep and even increase their weightings. This is simply the result of the indiscriminate use of a money-aggregate to measure the fallacious concept of economic growth. So GDP and related statistics do not measure progress: if anything they promote economic regression.
Instead, we must conclude that GDP is an approximation of the amount of money deployed in an economy. It is equal to a combination of measured production, government spending and price changes. Let us assume for a moment that extra factors of production at a given price level are not available, so production only progresses depending on how existing factors of production are redeployed. Let us further assume government spending and regulation of the private sector is also unchanged. These two conditions being the case, economic growth must be a reflection of price changes, which in turn is the result of changes in the quantity of money deployed in the economy. And in recording “real” economic growth, that is economic growth adjusted by a price-inflation index, statisticians avoid recording most of the effects of monetary inflation. Therefore, economic growth is not growth at all: it is just an alternative and flawed measure of unreported monetary inflation.
We would not take the central planners’ flawed attempts to manipulate an economy and the statistical outcomes seriously were it not for the ultimate consequences. Not only have they completely deceived the public over economic growth, but they deceive themselves. For this reason they are unequipped to deal with the developing crises, which are the result of earlier interventions. They now claim that economic growth, the ultimate source of tax revenue and government solvency is jeopardised by spending cuts. Statistically, this is obviously true, because if you take away government costs and support for unwanted economic activities, GDP will fall. But the important point that is commonly missed is that a government which stops draining an economy of its private sector resources actually releases them to be deployed more effectively for the common benefit by those randomly-acting entrepreneurs.
And that, ultimately, is the way out of all economic difficulties.
[i] There are some excellent analyses of Capital Theory, but the error of converting random actions into common objectives, central to understanding the destructive effects of central planning, gets little attention. This is a mistake.
Mainstream economists seem to have a problem understanding prices. They might draw supply and demand curves and talk about elasticity. They are sure to have been taught the quantity theory of money. These are merely concepts, debating points in a classroom, with limited practical value. The consequence of replacing price concepts for price reality is that modern economists do not appreciate the consequences of monetary policy.
The most common error is to associate rising prices only with an increase in demand for goods and services, making it hard to imagine price inflation without economic growth. Stagflation, or inflation in a stagnating economy, becomes an unwelcome surprise, but is easily explained at the transactional level. In the pricing of anything, both the supply of the goods in question and the quantity of money available will have a fundamental bearing in setting the price. However, these factors are not necessarily considered when goods are sold and are often ignored.
Crucially, consumers assume that a dollar is a dollar and they never, for the purpose of day-to-day spending, question the value of paper money. People will say they are aware that the purchasing power of paper money declines over time, but they still expect the prices of everyday goods to be the same tomorrow as they are today. If they rise, they normally blame the retailer or perhaps some specific shortage, never realising that they are the victims of what they are otherwise aware of, the declining purchasing power of money. As monetary inflations progress there comes a point where this understanding changes. Increasing numbers of consumers will become aware that fiat money is losing purchasing power rather than the prices of goods rising. Trust in paper money begins to evaporate and the move into physical goods commences, gradually at first but then at an increasing pace. This is what the Austrian economist von Mises called “Katastrophenhausse” – the crack-up boom. Today, with paper money unbacked by anything other than public confidence in it, we are logically exposed to a new katastrophenhausse at any time, if that confidence is challenged.
Besides confidence, the interest that fiat money earns is the only true support it has. Unfortunately, the remedy of deliberately raising interest rates is impractical, because of the very high levels of public and private sector debt. Jacking up interest rates will only bankrupt insolvent governments and other borrowers, and the interest costs would end up being covered by the creation of yet more fiat money.
At some stage, the excesses of monetary inflation will undermine prices, irrespective of economic conditions, raising fundamental questions about purchasing power and confidence in fiat currency. So what does a central banker do? If he keeps a lid on interest rates a crack-up boom results. And if he raises interest rates, monetary inflation accelerates even faster, leading again to a crack-up boom.
It is a classic debt trap: you are damned if you do and damned if you don’t. The important point for owners of gold and silver is that rising interest rates should drive prices higher, and not suppress them as commentators might expect.
The consolidation of gold’s bull phase from October 2008 to the peak last September was a classic three-leg correction: an initial slide, rally, and final sell-off. Silver followed a similar but more violent pattern. The psychology was there too, with the final sell-off convincing many investors the game was finally over.
Those who sold will most probably be kicking themselves. Consolidations that break established trends, such as 200-day moving averages, shake out weak holders who will buy again higher up when they are more confident. The big traders in the futures market know this: your losses are simply their gains. And as a result both gold and silver are on a far sounder footing with these weak holders out of the way. It is lethal for your savings to play this game. Instead it is more sensible to understand what is happening in simple economic terms. To do this you must turn your normal thinking upside down, and realise that what is happening to precious metals prices is only a reflection of what is actually happening to paper money.
Put simply, governments all over the world are debasing their paper monies at an accelerating rate. Printing euros to rescue the banks has been in the headlines, but this process has only just begun. America, which has to be the focus of monetary attention, is committed to zero interest rates for the next three years, which is unprecedented. The result is that the price of gold has been left behind by exceptional monetary events. You can see this clearly in the chart below.
This chart shows US dollar True Money Supply (cash, instant deposits and checking accounts plus a few other minor cash balances) expressed in official gold reserves held at the US Treasury. This has soared over the years, and we can expect it to accelerate further from December’s figure of $31,600 per ounce of gold. Meanwhile, the percentage of TMS actually backed by gold stood at 4.8% at the year-end, and this is shown by the blue line.
The chart clearly shows that while gold has risen dramatically over the last decade in nominal dollar terms, adjusted for the extra money in the system it has only risen 150%. Amazingly, the price of gold measured in these TMS terms has only risen to where it was in late 1991, when the nominal price was $360. Gold’s valuation is therefore still at exceptionally low levels.
The sense of perspective charts like this imparts is vital for understanding the dangers from the tsunami of paper money and debt. Conventional portfolio managers have missed this point entirely, being hampered by the legacies of portfolio management theory and Keynesian economics. But there is a growing band of private individuals around the world who do get it and are accumulating physical gold and silver. They are beginning to understand that paper money is falling rather than gold and silver rising.
The message is if you think like an investor, you will probably lose your investment. Be aware of what is happening to paper money and you probably won’t.
This article was previously published at GoldMoney.com.
Both the US Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank are now offering limitless quantities of new money – the ECB to support the banks, and the Fed for reasons (despite explanations) that are not entirely clear. The Fed in its press release announced that it expected interest rates to “warrant exceptionally low levels for the Federal Funds Rate at least through late 2014.” The fact that the central banks governing the two most important currencies in the world are issuing money to all-comers at very little interest cost for up three years has not been lost on gold and silver, whose prices shot up in response to the Fed’s announcement.
The Fed has effectively extended its zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) for another 18 months. The reason stated is “low rates of resource utilisation and a subdued outlook for inflation in the medium run”. More important perhaps and unsaid is the presidential election due later this year and the need to finance a deficit that seems impossible to cut.
The Fed is running huge risks with its extended ZIRP, principally with monetary inflation morphing into price inflation. To help achieve its low inflation target the Fed uses the Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index (PCEPI), which assumes that consumers switch spending from higher priced goods to those that are stable or falling. The result is that this index rises at about one-third less than the Consumer Price Index, which itself rises at less than half the CPI calculated on the more honest methodology used before 1980. The upshot is that the Fed uses inflation targets that are so heavily adjusted that they are effectively meaningless.
To the Keynesians at the Fed, subdued inflation is linked with a sluggish economy, and here the Fed is very selective in its approach. It admits that employment is picking up, and household spending “continues to advance”; but instead chooses to worry over slowing fixed investment and a depressed housing sector. Surely, whatever your views, there are enough signs of economic stabilisation to justify sitting on the fence, instead of committing to ZIRP for an extra 18 months.
I take the view that Gross Domestic Product is likely to surprise on the upside, as I wrote in an article for GoldMoney on 10 January. In that article I gave concrete reasons why, and suggested that money will begin to flow from capital markets into the economy. This is important, because GDP is only a money quantity and can rise without any underlying economic progression – the difference being reflected in the prices of goods and services. So GDP can actually rise with no underlying improvement in economic activity, it merely reflecting higher prices.
Changes in the prices of goods and services are actually impossible to measure and so cannot be quantified. Under-reporting price increases by using an index approximation such as the GDP deflator, which represents price inflation similarly to the PCEPI, artificially inflates real GDP. It will be interesting to hear what excuse the Fed comes up with then for the continuing for even longer with ZIRP. The reality is that the Fed and other central bankers are cornered and have only one tool left: issue as much paper money as it takes to prevent systemic financial calamity. This realisation is only just dawning on individuals with savings to protect, which is why precious metals were right to rise so sharply.
This article was previously published at GoldMoney.com.
US unemployment figures came in better than expected last week at 8.5%. While noting that the figures under-represent actual unemployment, does this improvement mark the beginning of an American economic recovery? If so, it is the last thing the consensus expects.
Let us assume for a moment that Europe’s banks are rescued from the crisis. This being the case, there is every possibility a US recovery will take place for two basic reasons: businesses are always keen to invest as soon as market conditions stop deteriorating, and secondly GDP should begin to reflect increased quantities of money flowing into the economy. I shall comment on each in turn.
Businesses in the US have been accumulating cash in these uncertain times, and it is generally assumed, incorrectly, that managers are happy to just sit on this accumulating cash. It is not in the nature of business to sit idly waiting for the tide to turn: businessmen are entrepreneurs who continually seek profitable opportunities, recognising that wasting time is itself an expense.
This is why the capitalist system survives despite and not because of the attempts of central bankers and governments to assist the entrepreneurial function. And once capital investment begins to recover, competition ensures it spreads. The conditions now exist for this recovery to take place, if only because the bad news is elsewhere and interest rates are extremely low. We can therefore assume (Europe and other systemic disasters permitting) that a business recovery should take place. How far this goes before rising commodity and energy prices derail it is another matter.
Meanwhile the expansion of raw money since 2008 has been remarkable, but so far the bulk of this money has either gone back on deposit at the Fed, is being deployed for speculation in capital markets, or is funding the government. Very little of this money has actually added to the GDP statistic by being deployed in the economy, which will change when businesses go further than just reinvesting cash balances, and actually borrow to build capacity.
Putting this together, in the earliest stages of economic recovery companies reinvest their own money. The benefit to the GDP statistic is marginal to begin with, but as economic recovery gains momentum and businesses begin to borrow, money will flow into the economy from capital markets, inflating the GDP money-value. So by the time it is confirmed at the GDP level, the recovery will actually be well under way.
The political consequences in an election year of such a development are beyond the scope of this article. Rising interest rates will begin to be discounted, giving support to the dollar; but before that happens a bear squeeze should develop in energy and commodity futures, partly because markets are wrong-footed for economic recovery, partly because market liquidity has been reduced as a result of the MF Global scandal, and partly because the outlook for price inflation will change radically.
Precious metals should fare well. Industry will want to build silver stocks to lock in low prices, conflicting with physical demand from investors, and gold should get a significant boost from the change in the inflationary outlook.
This article was previously published at GoldMoney.com.
This phrase has suddenly started appearing in economic research, and will probably do so more frequently in the coming months. Its origin is a Bank for International Settlements working paper co-authored by Carmen Reinhart and Belen Sbrancia, economists well enough known to merit attention. So what is it all about?
Financial repression includes directed lending to governments by captive funds such as pension and insurance funds, artificial caps on interest rates, restrictions on capital flows and a generally tighter connection between government and banks. Some or all of these devices have been used in the past to reduce the level of government debt to GDP, particularly in the two decades after the Second World War. Many countries reduced the level of their outstanding debt by a significant amount over a 10 to 20 year timeframe through these techniques, assisted by moderate levels of inflation.
Two of the alternatives to financial repression listed in the paper are clearly unpalatable: default, and “a burst of high inflation”. Two further alternatives are either impractical or politically unattractive: economic growth, which is slipping away further into the future, and austerity plans involving years of unpopular policies with the risk of a deflationary depression. For these reasons, financial repression seems the default option to Reinhart and Sbrancia.
Some of its elements are already being implemented. eurozone bail-outs involve contributions from government-controlled pension funds. Bank and financial regulation allocates lower risk weightings to government debt, giving it a systemic subsidy despite current events. Interest rates are being held below the rate of inflation by central banks, lowering the cost of borrowing for most governments to artificially cheap levels.
But will it work this time? To do so will require private individuals to continue with an unquestioning belief in the soundness of their paper currencies. In the wake of Bretton Woods, when there was a gold exchange standard underpinning the dollar, together with higher levels of national patriotism, the might of the dollar was never questioned. Instead, we now have a US dollar-standard with substantial levels of foreign ownership of government debt and an increasingly sceptical public. This suggests that financial repression would probably bring on a currency crisis.
Reinhart and Sbrancia are not recommending financial repression, but they are right to point out its attractions to governments in financial difficulties. It is, in the cliché often used today, a description of the various means of kicking the can down the road. This is something governments have been doing for a long time: it has generally worked in the past, so they are almost certain to assume it will work again now.
However, economic and financial problems are rapidly mounting. Today’s situation is very different from the end of WW2 with all that destructive spending replaced by people rebuilding for the future, as they did in the 1950s and 1960s. Instead, our systemic and economic problems are leading to yet more deterioration in government finances. No amount of financial repression can fix that.
I recently posted an article for GoldMoney showing how US True Money Supply (TMS) appeared to be growing at a hyperbolic rate, and that gold was also on a hyperbolic course. The difference between hyperbolic and exponential is a hyperbola’s rate of growth increases with time, while exponential growth does not. Hyperbolic growth in the quantity of money ends with hyperinflation, while exponential growth can go on for ever. Both TMS and the dollar price of gold are pointing to a hyperinflationary outcome. This article explains why this might be so.
There are five apocalyptic engines pushing the growth in US money supply: they are the government’s budget deficit, its debt trap, the financial condition of the banks, the delusion of Keynesian solutions, and lastly simple compounding arithmetic.
The US government collects only 55c in taxes for every dollar spent. It is relying on economic recovery to reduce welfare payments and increase tax revenue to close the gap. This prospect is receding and establishment economists advise against cutting government spending.
The US government’s debt trap is concealed by the exceptionally low interest cost of funding. The only reason this cost is not higher is the Fed maintains a zero interest rate policy. However, as surely as night follows day, price inflation will start rising as monetary inflation feeds through, forcing the Fed to allow interest rates to rise long before any economic recovery occurs. The rise in interest costs will escalate the budget deficit, which will be financed, directly or indirectly by further monetary expansion.
The banks’ balance sheets are considerably weaker than stated, because of unrealised losses on assets, loan collateral and write-downs on their own debt. Real estate collateral write-downs alone probably exceed bank equity of $1,400bn. On an honest analysis the US commercial banks are collectively bankrupt. To simply survive the banks have no alternative other than to reduce loan exposure while requiring continuing monetary support from the Fed.
Keynesian economists, aware of the banks’ difficulties are terrified of bank credit contraction. For this reason, the macroeconomic establishment strongly promotes the expansion of narrow money to buy off a deflationary depression.
As the purchasing power of the dollar falls, the result of past monetary expansion, yet more dollars have to be issued to cover increased government costs. Past inflation becomes a compounding factor behind price rises.
Essentially, money will be printed at an accelerating rate to buy time rather than face the three realities of government default, an over-indebted private sector, and a bankrupt banking system. The Keynesians are belatedly aware of the dangers and see no alternative to printing as much money as is required to defer these problems. The monetarists in the central banks are hesitant, torn between Keynesian fears of outright deflation and worries about the rate of monetary expansion so far.
However, the history of monetary inflation confirms that once it enters a hyperbolic phase, it is almost impossible to stop. Armchair critics have derided the stupidity of central banks and economists in past hyperinflations, such as in Weimar Germany, Argentina and Zimbabwe. The truth is that when hyperinflation has become visible at the price level, it has already gone past the point of no return at the monetary level.
This article was previously published at GoldMoney.com.
In this video Philipp Bagus, Assistant professor of Economics at Madrid’s Universidad Rey Juan Carlos and author of The Tragedy of the Euro and Alasdair Macleod of the GoldMoney Foundation talk about the eurozone facing the problem that is characterised in the “tragedy of the commons” analogy. Bagus explains this phenomenon by way of an example of overfished and over-exploited oceans due to a lack of property rights on oceans. In Europe, governments run larger deficits than their “competitors” in order to externalise the costs to all users of the currency. Knowing these incentives, the Stability and Growth Pact was put in place as per the early 1990s Maastricht Treaty, capping budget deficits at 3% of GDP and the debt to GDP level at 60%. However there was no enforcement of these rules which is why there have already been more than 80 infringements to this stability pact without any repercussions.
They talk about possible solutions to the euro crisis. Bagus points out that there are basically three different ways to go about it. Firstly, governments could make drastic cuts in public spending and privatise public assets in order to balance their budgets. However, there will be – and is – strong political resistance to such proposals. Secondly, the eurozone could disintegrate, driven by a reluctance of German citizens to pay for other countries’ expenditures. And lastly, central banks and governments could decide to print their way out of the crisis, leading to high inflation.
Bagus says that as long as the incentive for running deficits exists there won’t be an increase in countries’ savings rates. Macleod points out that there is great institutional resistance to breaking up the euro. Bagus explains that the official opinion towards the euro is positive in Germany; however the sentiment on the streets looks quiet different. But as long as there is no political party devoted to this issue this mood is not likely to gain traction at least as long as inflation remains moderate.
Amid the ongoing expansion of the money supply and persistent deficits, Bagus can’t see the dollar gaining in value over the medium to long term. He also says that ECB policies are a lot more pragmatic than the ones undertaken by the US Federal Reserve. Talking about sound money, Bagus explains different ways to go about its introduction. One way would be to back all the money in existence by gold, adjusting the price of gold accordingly. Another would be to take away legal tender laws and have competing currencies. However this would require the governments to impose dramatic reforms, which is partly why they will oppose such measures.
This interview was recorded on November 15 2011 in Madrid.
For some time I have taken the view that rescuing eurozone governments from their financial crises was too big a job for the European Central Bank, which should stick to keeping the banking system going. The only hope was that individual governments would be forced to face up to the reality of cutting government spending hard and quickly. They have failed to even begin to address this fundamental problem. As a consequence, it is now impossible for them to roll over their maturing debt, let alone raise new money. Instead there is now a scramble into cash as banks and hedge funds prepare themselves for sovereign defaults.
Posturing over geared stability funds, financial transaction taxes, installing unelected governments, putative treaty changes and finally enhanced fiscal supervision proposals have finally convinced markets that the only outcome is widespread government defaults. There is now no alternative and the fallout will have to be managed.
The inept handling of this crisis has weakened the eurozone’s banks to the point that they are unable to subscribe for more debt. Furthermore, the ECB cannot afford to see the liquidity it provides to European banks disappear into new government bonds that will default anyway. Therefore, it is now in the ECB’s interest to see sovereign defaults occur as soon as possible, unless the International Monetary Fund can come to the rescue, which is looking less likely by the day.
There is growing evidence that there is insufficient support for an IMF bailout from its member governments. The IMF’s charter is as an intergovernmental lender of last resort, not a supporter of government profligacy. Following the failure of the G20 meeting in mid-October there has been no substantive attempt to rescue the eurozone. The telephones might be buzzing, but there is no urgent meeting, suggesting that events must take their course.
So the quicker these defaults happen, the sooner the ECB can work with the national central banks to bail out the major Eurozone commercial banks. Once we accept this line of reasoning, we must think about the likely candidates. In no particular order they are France, Italy and Greece: France and Italy because they have to roll enormous amounts of debt in the coming months and Greece for obvious reasons. Less pressing perhaps but also likely default candidates are Belgium, Spain, Portugal and Ireland: Belgium might fall with France and the others have the potential to struggle through but might chose to wipe the slate clean. And when the first goes, the rest will surely follow rapidly.
The sequence of events is now under way. This will be followed by the defaults themselves, and the likely trigger will be escalating French government bond yields.
In summary, we have reached the point where the ECB’s vested interest requires eurozone governments to default because further delay will make the rescue of the currency and banking system more difficult. Expect co-ordination between the Bank for International Settlements, The Fed, Bank of England and Bank of Japan to smooth markets through the turmoil and to back up the ECB.
This article was previously published at GoldMoney.com.
