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Events

So, in late March I am speaking in Belgium

Having previously lived in Brussels between 2002 and 2005 I have long been aware of the wide range of radical liberals in Belgium. There are many excellent people and organisations there. There is the Ludwig Von Mises Institute Europe - www.vonmisesinstitute-europe.org - the Rothbard Institute - rothbard.be – and the Institut Economique Molinari - www.institutmolinari.org – to name but a tiny fraction.

It is with this in mind that I am delighted to be speaking on 24 March 2010 to the LVSV - www.lvsvgent.be - an excellent liberal student society at the University in Gent with more than 75 years of debating history behind them.

Apart from the good food, the gracious hospitality and the elegant architecture one always finds in this part of the world, I am really looking forward to explaining to their highly motivated students that central banks, coerced fractional reserve banking and nationalised monopoly currencies have nothing to do with the free market. Instead, they are statist engines of ruinous disaster.

Economics

A day of reckoning: how to end the banking crisis now

Drawing on the work of Nobel Laureates in economics from three traditions, plus numerous other distinguished scholars, Cobden Centre Chairman, economist and successful entrepreneur Toby Baxendale presents an informal introduction to our proposal for honest money and the benefits consequent on the reform. See also our precis of Irving Fisher’s 100% Money.

Fact

  • The average overhang of credit to money of all banks in the United Kingdom is 34 x to its reserves i.e. its actual money base1.
  • If more than one person in 34 walks into all banks simultaneously to withdraw their deposits, there will be a system wide bank run and a mass liquidity event with systematic default and insolvency.
  • We saw the start of this with Northern Rock in the summer of 2007.
  • We attempt to paper over the cracks and restore confidence in the banking system still today – with little success2.
Sterling Liquid Assets (BoE FSR, Jun 2009)

Sterling Liquid Assets (BoE FSR, Jun 2009)

A practical, politically-acceptable proposal

Our proposal is, as Irving Fisher wrote, “The opposite of radical”:

  • Require 100% cash reserves to be held against all demand deposits; there can never be a crisis if a bank always holds 100% cash against all its demand deposits.
  • Parliament can do this with one Act.

A similar Act took place in 1844. The Bank Charter Act or “Peel’s Act” established a 100% reserve requirement for bank notes that were issued claiming to be redeemable in gold. The reality was that there were 23 notes in issue for every one unit of gold at the time, creating instability, “panic” and general economic chaos. Not a too dissimilar situation from today where we have 34 claims on money to one unit of money. Politicians in the 19th century did not see the creation of unbacked credit through accounting entries as a problem, since it was only done on a very small scale. The problem then was rampant note issue (claims to real money) well over and above the monetary base, as this was the preferred method the bankers used at the time.

It is often forgotten but when you place £1m in a savings account (in cash) in say the Royal Bank of Scotland, which has no legal reserve requirement, they then lend £970k (in credit) , keeping on average 3% of cash back in reserves, to an entrepreneur in say HSBC, who then deposits that money in HSBC. We now have one claim to the original £1m and one claim to the £970k. The money supply has moved from £1m to £1.97m – just like magic! This is credit expansion.

The reality is that across all the banks in the United Kingdom licensed by the Bank of England, we have for every £1 of money (in cash), £34 in claims to money (credit)!

Peel’s problem was the over issue of notes to gold: our problem is the over issue of credit to money.

Continue reading “A day of reckoning: how to end the banking crisis now”

  1. See the Bank of England’s Financial Stability Report. Oral evidence from Sir Fred Goodwin (RBS) and Mr Andy Hornby (HBOS) to the Treasury Select Committee was at variance with our calculations:
    Q1864 Mr Love: Sir Fred, can I ask you, following on from those questions, how leveraged was RBS at the time of the Lehman’s dissolution?
    Sir Fred Goodwin: I think there would have been a variety of different ways of looking at the leverage ratio.

    Q1865 Mr Love: I am just looking for a rough idea, order of magnitude.
    Mr Fred Goodwin: Towards the higher end but there would be others higher than us. We would have loans to deposit.

    Q1866 Mr Love: What was the ratio?
    Sir Fred Goodwin: 110% but there would be others similar to that, there would be some higher and some lower. We were to the right of the middle, we were at the higher end of the middle.

    Q1867 Mr Love: Mr Hornby, can you tell us what it was for HBOS?
    Mr Hornby: Yes, our loans and advances were around £450 million, our customer deposits were about £250 million, therefore the percentage of one to the other was around 57%.

    See http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmtreasy/144/144i.pdf – Page EV246, Q1864 []

  2. See for example, Caithness, ”My Lords, the Banking Bill which we are currently discussing in the House is very complex and detailed, but it does nothing to resolve the current banking crisis, which lies at the heart of our economic problems. The noble Lord, Lord Peston, has just said that it is the fault of the bankers. I agree with him up to a point, but would go further and say that the fault that really needs correcting is our whole banking system.” []
Economics

The violation of Mr Smith

Mr Smith works hard, plans carefully, and saves what he can, putting his money into a building society.  He pays his credit card bills off each month, and tries to overpay his mortgage when he can.

Mr Smith got a 3% pay rise last year – inflation was only 2% – so he felt good about that.  But… he doesn’t feel any wealthier.

Year after year, the government had said that the economy was growing strongly, but still, things seemed harder for his family and him.  Train ticket prices up again.  Heating bills rocketed when the price of oil went up, but never seemed to come down.  He swears a loaf of bread and a pint of milk were much cheaper in years gone by.

When he changes his cash for Euros, he realises that his holiday in France is now unbearably expensive.  His tax rates didn’t go up, but still, after all his bills were paid, he seemed to have less and less spare cash than he remembers a few years ago.

There are Mr Smiths everywhere.  Careful folk, who plan, save for a rainy day and have a sense of personal responsibility.

Smith is the target.

It is Mr Smith who is going to pay for the banking crisis.

His saved wealth will pay the national debt.

His prudence will bail out Gordon Brown’s profligacy.

His forgone holiday will pay the banker’s bonuses.

His careful spending will pay for the vast number of quangos.

His financial planning will bail out the failed NHS computer project, over-budget military programs and ID cards.

His sense of responsibility will end up funding the destruction meted out in Iraq and Afghanistan.

It won’t be the politicians or the bankers who pay for global warming – he will.

He knows he pays tax… but what is hard for him to comprehend is that there is another pernicious process draining his wealth and subverting his hard work towards paying for the misjudgement of others.  Whether he likes it or not, he naively pays for the decisions made by the political class.

He has no choice. No option.  He was never asked to vote for it.  And for the most part, the act of theft is so subtle he doesn’t even know it is happening.

Why does he feel poorer?

Why is it that Mr Smith seemed to miss the  ‘boom’, yet is hurting more in the bust?  Why doesn’t life get easier for him?  What is going on?

Inflation.

As technology produces things more cheaply, Mr Smith should have been able to reap the rewards – except that things don’t get cheaper for him.  Society cheats him when the government opens the spigot of new money, washing this value away as the torrent of new money chases prices higher beyond his reach.

The winners are always those close to the gusher – the banks, financiers and politicians.  These are the ones who get to spend the new money first, thus chase prices up before Mr Smith gets any sniff of what is happening.

To save or to invest?

Think about your personal circumstances.  Every time your payslip comes in, you have a choice of how much to spend and how much to save.  Every rational person knows that there is a balance to be struck between current enjoyment (consumption) and future enjoyment (savings – or deferred consumption).

This choice is exactly the same for society as a whole.  As a country, we must decide how much to consume, and how much to defer consumption in order to allow our children and us to enjoy things in the future.

The choice for us all is simple.  Defer consumption and invest for the future, or consume and enjoy now.

What is the process by which we save for the future?  There are two ways.

  1. Voluntary saving.  If society needs to invest for the future, but people prefer to consume, then the savings rate – the profits paid on investments and/or the interest rate paid on deposits, rises until people choose to defer consumption and invest.
  2. Forced saving.  Government policy forces a decrease of the purchasing power of money via inflation of the money supply.  The net effect is a transference of wealth from savers and fixed income groups towards net borrowers (itself included).  It also creates an artificial pool of liquidity into which the government can sell its IOUs.

The evil of Forced Saving

The natural state of affairs in a free market, with a more consistent supply of money, is that general prices fall as technology advances.  The prudent are rewarded, and borrowers have to carefully evaluate and moderate their flights of fancy, only investing borrowed funds carefully in sound projects.

When the value of money declines, savers find that their money buys less, whilst borrowers are happy to find that they can repay their debts with money of a decreased value.  It’s like borrowing five books from the library and finding that you are only required to give four back!

By setting a target for rising prices and then pulling levers to increase the supply of money in the economy to achieve it, the government prevents the natural response of general prices to competition, increased efficiency and innovation: they stop prices from falling.

Entrepreneurs, innovators, inventors and new businesses exist because they believe that they can satisfy society’s wants better than they have been served before.  They have ideas, innovations and take risks in order to provide goods that are cheaper than they otherwise would be.  Businesses operating in a competitive environment always seek to reduce costs, be that one step more efficient and produce a cheaper or better widget.  As group of people, entrepreneurs bring efficiency and innovation, and they make stuff cheaper.

The benefit to Mr Smith should be that his income goes further.  As time progresses, technological innovation should mean he can buy more with the same cash.  But that’s not what happens, as any pensioner knows.  Saved money buys far less now than it did at the time it was saved.

Governments achieve rising prices by encouraging the supply of new money.  This new money comes from the central bank via its control of the banking system.  The first users of this new money are invariably politicians, finance capitalism and big business. These guys get to use the newly minted money first, and thus spend it first.  This process bids up prices, leaving everyone else chasing behind, and poor old Mr Smith last in the queue.

What an evil system it is then, when government can control money in such a way as to give it a first user advantage that penalises all those in the general population whose wealth is being rapidly diluted.  A process that systematically violates and loots pensions, savings, fixed incomes and the actions of prudent, and rewards the profligate, the speculative borrowers and above all, rewards the biggest borrower of all: Government.

Let’s be clear.  The current system is a process that diverts the benefits of innovation and technological advancement that should accrue to the general population, and thrusts it towards the desired spending of the well connected and the political class.

We need to stop this continual violation of the little man.  Mr Smith has to start realising what is happening to him.

That’s why I’m proud to support the efforts of the Cobden Centre.

Economics

Banking: the shape of the debate

ESCP EuropeShould banks be permitted to operate with a fractional reserve on demand deposits or should 100% reserves be a legal requirement? Should there be a central bank with a monopoly on note issue? What are the consequences of these choices? These were mainstream questions in the 19th century and they demand attention today. Here, following the ESCP Europe/Cobden Centre “Colloquium on Honest Money”, Steve Baker  frames the debate to be had about money and banking.

Today, people are well aware that we have a banking crisis, a “credit crunch“. That is, there is a problem in the financial system, a system which is centrally planned — see Economic Interventionism, Banks and the Crisis – and an approach which necessarily works badly – see Strip the Bank of England of its power. So, what are the features of the present system and what are the alternatives?

The two important features of the present, orthodox system are:

  • The banks are not required to keep money in reserve to the value of demand deposits. That is, they operate with a fractional reserve. As Toby Baxendale has pointed out, today if more than one person in 34 asks their bank for their money back in notes and coins, which is a reasonable, contractually-sound request, we will have a systemic banking crisis — a run on all banks — because there is simply not as much cash as people’s bank statements say there is.
  • There are, across the world, central banks in which committees of experts set “monetary policy” — see The kindness of geniuses – a rate of interest which, through various mechanisms, affects the entire economy.  And the economy is, of course, what people choose to do, since the economy is nothing more or less than the cooperation of thinking, acting individuals and of corporations run by thinking, acting individuals; therefore, manipulating the interest rate necessarily distorts the actions of people and the productive structure. Central banks also act as “lenders of last resort” in the event of a run on a particular bank — which is possible because of their fractional reserve — but in the case of Northern Rock, the Bank of England did not ultimately fulfill that role.

Stepping back from today’s monetary orthodoxy — a fractional reserve and a central bank — the options are plain: we can have a 100% reserve on demand deposits, or not, and separately, we can have central banks with a monopoly on the supply of currency, or not. Hence, Jesús Huerta de Soto models (PDF) the banking debate as follows:

The shape of the banking debate

The shape of the debate (click to enlarge)

As Irving Fisher, one of the founders of Monetarism, pointed out in the sub-title and content of his book 100% Money, there are potential benefits to be gained from moving to another system. For example, Fisher identified the following as the headline benefits of moving to a 100% reserve requirement:

  • keeping chequing banks 100% liquid so that there can be no more runs on banks,
  • preventing inflation and deflation,
  • largely curing or preventing depressions,
  • and wiping out much of the National Debt.

Since we have had a run on a bank, since the money supply has deflated, since attempts to reflate the money supply risk price inflation and distort the economy, since the boom-bust cycle is evidently still in progress and since we are doubling our national debt, it is perhaps worth taking seriously the question of how our system of money and banking is organized.

Furthering that discussion was the purpose of the recent ESCP Europe/Cobden Centre Colloquium on Honest Money directed by Founding Fellow Dr Anthony J. Evans, Chaired by Corporate Affairs Director Steve Baker and attended by Chairman Toby Baxendale amongst 9 other academics and practitioners in the field of money and banking.

We will continue to develop and promote a range of ideas to open up and further the debate on money and banking.

Further Reading

Economics

A brief guide to money and banking

Today, we publish our brief guide to money and banking.

A Brief Guide to Money and Banking

The Guide comprises:

  • Four charts showing how Baxendale and Evans’ measure of the money supply correlates to economic activity whereas the Bank of England’s measures do not,
  • How wealth is created,
  • What is and is not money,
  • What is wrong with the mechanistic Quantity Theory of Money,
  • The role of the interest rate in the business cycle,
  • How banking has become socialised through legal privilege and taxpayer guarantee,
  • The shape of the debate on money and banking.

Economics

My Journey to Austrianism via the City

A speech by James Tyler to the Adam Smith Institute Next Generation Group, 6th October 2009. This speech is also available on hedgehedge.com.

I have spent the best part of the last two decades picking my wits against the market. It’s an unforgiving game: I’ve seen ups and downs, and many of my rivals buried under an avalanche of hubris, passion, illogical thought and unchecked emotion.

I have witnessed the sheer folly of the ERM crisis, the Asian crisis, the failure of the Gods at Long Term Capital Management and the insanity of the tech boom.

I have enjoyed the ‘NICE’ decade (None Inflationary Constant Expansion), and scared myself silly during the credit crisis.

I am a trader.

I risk my own money and live or die by my decisions, and face the threat of personal bankruptcy every time I switch my screens on. I get no salary – indeed I turn up at the start of the month with a large office overhead – a ‘negative’ salary. I have no fancy company pension scheme, no lucrative monopoly or franchise.

I eat what I kill.

Mistakes cost me my livelihood, so, above all, my decisions have to be rooted in practical and logical decision making.

Some have called my kind parasitic, but I would have said that I bring order, efficiency, predictability, stability and deep liquidity to crucial process: a process that makes the whole world keep ticking.

I make money work.

I make the market in interest rate derivatives: a market born out of the neo classical revolution in finance fostered in Chicago during the 1970s. I am a child of Freidman, Fisher Black, Myron Scholes and the modern international financial system.

My analysis was steeped in the neo-classical, efficient markets paradigm.

Friedman’s ideal was working. Enlightened central bankers guided the free market with gentle nudges and short term liquidity infusions, free floating currencies gently adjusted themselves to the constant flow of new information and efficient and rational markets took all in their stride.

Credit flowed, people got wealthier, economies developed and all was well.

And then the crisis struck.
Continue reading “My Journey to Austrianism via the City”

Economics

Money is not working.

A speech to the Policy Exchange on 31st March 2009 by Cobden Centre sponsor James Tyler. This article first appeared on hedgehedge.com.

I want to talk about two things today;

Number 1: Free markets did NOT cause this crisis… Governments did.

Number 2: Inflation targeting has failed. Money has failed. What should we do?

Free markets did not cause this problem.

In theory, markets work by reacting to prices and direct capital towards where it will be most productively used. This is how wealth is created. Usually this works well, but markets are made up of humans, and can be fooled into overshooting by false signals.

Bubbles build up, expanding until people lose confidence. Bubbles then burst. It’s a corrective process that, relatively benignly, irons out imbalances.

The problem only comes when bubbles go on for too long, because once they get too big, the pop can be terrifying. And that’s what we’ve got now – one hell of a big bang.

False signals have caused a spectacular mal-investment in real estate and its derivatives.

But these false signals did not come from the market, but from government.

False signals.

False signals came from Greenspan’s introduction of welfare for markets. Markets were taught that no matter how much risk they took, they would always be saved. 1987, 1994, 1998, 2001. Each bust bigger than the last, and disaster was only staved off with aggressive rate cuts and increased money supply.

Clearly this was not laissez faire. Just think if events had been allowed to take their course. I bet if LTCM had gone bust then a badly burned Wall Street would have learned a lesson and Lehman’s would still be around today.

In 1999 Clinton mandated that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac reduce lending standards. The poor were encouraged into debt. This intervention triggered a race to the bottom of lending standards as commercial banks were forced to compete against the limitless pockets of Uncle Sam.

False signals came from deposit insurance. Deposit your money in a boring mutual? Why bother when you can lend it to a lump of volcanic rock in the Atlantic at 7% and be guaranteed to get your money back.

The Basle banking accords required banks to replace rock solid reserves with maths.

Government protected and regulated ratings agencies produced negligent ratings duping pension funds, who were obligated to buy high quality paper, into buying junk cleansed by untested mathematical models.

Central banks create boom-bust.

But most damaging of all was the absurdly low interest rates set between 2001 and 2004.

The resultant glut of cheap money fueled an unsustainable boom encouraging more mortgages to be taken out, and pushing property prices ever higher.

The market responded by pushing scarce economic capital towards highly speculative property development.

As prices rose people remortgaged, and borrowed to consume more. This unchecked process tended to be destructive, as scarce economic capital flowed out of our economy and headed to those economies efficiently producing consumer goods, such as China. Rampant asset inflation clouded our ability to see this depletion process in action.

Everyone had a great time whilst the party lasted, not least Governments who were incentivised to let it run, blinded by ever larger tax revenues.

But all parties come to an end, and central banks had to prick the bubble eventually. Interest rates went too high, and sub prime collapsed, and then all property prices plummeted. Trillions of dollars were ripped out of the financial system, and the credit crunch began.

It’s happened before.

But, despite its complexity, there was nothing new or unpredictable about this process. All the great busts of the 20th century were preceded by a Government sanctioned fiat currency booms.

In the 1920’s, the Fed pursued a ‘constant dollar’ policy. This was the era of the innovation, Model T Fords, radios and rapid technological advancement.

Things should have got cheaper for millions of people, but money supply was boosted to try and keep prices constant. All that extra money flowed into the stock market, pushing prices to crazy levels, and we all know how that ended.

In the modern day, targeting price changes has been an utter disaster for us too.

It let the Bank of England pretend they were doing their job, when money supply was growing at a double digit rate. It let the authorities relax whilst an economy threatening credit bubble was building up.

And it gave Gordon Brown the leeway to convince people that boom and bust was over.

Things should have got cheaper.

Inflation targeting made no allowance for globalisation, the rise of India and China, and the benign falls in general prices that should have been triggered. Think about it; if all those cheap goods were to become available, consumer prices should fall. We would have had greater purchasing power, and become wealthier for it.

But, the Bank of England was aiming at a symmetrical plus 2% target. Falling prices in some goods necessitated stimulating rises in others. They unleashed an avalanche of under priced debt and we had our own crazy asset boom.

Inflation targeting was a myopic policy.

Governments make terrible farmers.

When a central bank sets interest rates, they set the price of credit. Inevitably they create distortions.

Consider this; Governments cannot set food prices without causing a glut -or- painful shortages. Now, food is a pretty simple commodity, yet we all understand that central planners simply cannot gather enough information to set the price accurately.

It has to be left to the spontaneous interaction of thousands of buyers and sellers to set the price.

So, why do we think that enlightened bureaucrats can put an exact price on something as vital, yet complicated, as credit?

In a nutshell, if I can’t tell how much my wife will spend on Bond Street this weekend, how can they?

Let’s wake up from this fantasy.

There is a better way.

What’s the cure? Let the invisible hand to do its time honoured job. Leave interest rates to be set by the millions of suppliers and users of capital.

Get the central planners out of the way.

It’s the way it used to happen. The period of fastest economic growth the world has seen was America between the civil war and the end of the 19th century. Money was free and private and the Fed did not exist.

So, how do we get back to freedom in money? Fredrich Hayek – the great Austrian economist – did the best thinking on this. What he proposed was that private firms should be allowed to produce their own currencies, which would then be free to compete against each other. People would only hold currency that maintained its value, firms that over-issued would go bust Producers of ‘sound’ money would prosper.

History gives us plenty of successful examples of private money working well, 18th Century Scotland had competing banks, all with their own bank notes. People weren’t confused. It worked. There are many other examples.

In the modern age, technology makes the prospect of monetary competition even more tantalising. Mobile phones, oyster cards, smart tags, embedded chips, wireless networks. The internet. Prices could flash up in the shopper’s preferred currency.

A proposal.

Here’s an idea of how to kick the process off;

Tesco’s want to get into banking. Why not currencies as well? Tesco would print one million pieces of paper. Let’s call them Tesco pounds. It would be redeemable at any time for £10 or $15. They would then be auctioned, and the price of a Tesco set.

Anyone who owns a Tesco has a hedge against either the £ OR $ devaluing therefore the Tesco has an additional intrinsic value. Maybe they’ll auction at £12.

Tesco would specify a shopping basket of goods that cost £60. It would promise that 5 Tesco Pounds would always buy that weekly shop. The firm would use its assets to adjust the supply of Tesco Pounds so that they kept this stable value.

They would need to otherwise their shelves would be cleaned out!

As central banks inflated the £ and $ away over time, the convertibility into these currencies would matter less. We would be left with a hard currency that meant something.

There would be other competitors and a real choice about which money to hold your wealth in.

McDonalds has a better credit rating than Her Majesties Government, so maybe people would be happy to hold Big Mac tokens? I don’t know – it will be a free choice.

Currencies would sink or swim depending on how well they performed. What’s more, firms issuing the currencies would come up with different ways of maintaining their value. Some would offer Gold. Manufacturers may use notes backed up by steel, copper and oil.

Let’s see what a free market chooses. Somebody might have a brainwave and come up with an idea that nobody has thought of.

That is what free markets are best at.

I can guess the reactions that my proposal might inspire in some. How would the man on the street cope? Well, nobody would outlaw the Government’s money, and people could carry on as before. Through the operation of the market, we would find out what worked best . Step-by step, the economy would be transformed and standards driven up.

In economics, spontaneous orders are always so much more rational and stable than planned ones. Always.

Conclusion.

This is not a crisis caused by free markets. A free and unregulated market in money has not existed for over a century.

This is a Government crisis. A crisis over the monopoly of money.

Inflation targeting seemed so persuasive…. but it was a false God, and we deserve better. Stability and sound money can only come if we put the money supply back where it belongs…

Under the control of the free market.

Economics

Corrigan on central banking

Sean Corrigan digs up an anti-trust speech by Congressman Charles Lindbergh Senior, father of the famous aviator, who fires a broadside against the founders of the Federal Reserve and modern Fractional Reserve Free Banking.

He also digs deeply into the staggering funny money that has been created to “boost our economy.” We’re certainly seeing a superficial boost in all the liquid indices around the world, as we have pointed out on this site on a number of occasions, but for how long? Readers of this site would hopefully see through this illusion as Corrigan does.

Enjoy this little snippet, it is packed with goodies: download the report.

Economics

Don’t Blame the Federal Reserve – Stephen Mauzy – Mises Institute

Via Don’t Blame the Federal Reserve – Stephen Mauzy – Mises Institute:

Banks operate under a fractional-reserve system that allows them to create liabilities and money virtually at will. This system expands money beyond what it would otherwise be and guarantees inflation by pushing the broad money supply far beyond the base money. Money, in essence, is debt, with supply dictated by loan demand.

A full-reserve scheme would prevent banks from lending phantom money. Banks’ primary functions would be bifurcated into money warehousing and deposit lending. As warehouses, banks would collect fees for storing deposits, with the deposited funds always available to the depositor. As deposit lenders, banks would accept time deposits to lend. The depositor would earn interest for the use of his money, while the bank would earn the spread between the rate it paid to depositors and the rate it charged its borrowers.

Insufficient credit is the first and most voluble objection to a full-reserve banking system. This shortage may or may not occur. If it did, no problem — private finance companies would arise to fill the credit void. They wouldn’t accept deposits, instead they would raise funds by issuing equity and debt. These companies would be free to specialize and lend to what their charters dictate.

Economics

Fed signals pullback in liquidity supports

Via FT.com / US / Economy & Fed – Fed signals pullback in liquidity supports, we learn:

The Federal Reserve on Wednesday upgraded its assessment of the US economy and highlighted its intention to shut down most of its crisis-fighting liquidity facilities in early 2010.

And consequently:

Stocks eased slightly after the Fed statement, while the yield curve in the bond market steepened.


Which brings us on to Roger Koppl’s Big Players and the Economic Theory of Expectations.

I am indebted to Cobden Centre supporter Bruno Prior for introducing me to Koppl’s work which extends the tradition of Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek and others, unusually, applying empirical methods to demonstrate the application of the theory.

Koppl demonstrates, with extensive reference to other scholars, that investment and all other economic actions depend on “subjective” expectations. He then presents a theory of expectations which assumes people interpret their situations in unpredictable ways. This theory includes a theory of “Big Players”:

Big Players are privileged actors who disrupt markets. A Big Player has three defining characteristics. He is big in the sense that his actions influence the market under study. He is insensitive to the discipline of profit and loss. He is arbitrary in the sense that his actions depend on discretion rather than any set of rules. Big Players have power and use it.

We learn that Big Players reduce the reliability of expectations, thereby disrupting markets. They encourage herding and produce perverse effects on entrepreneurship: traders must pay attention to the Big Player and not the fundamentals.

And so we find today, for example, the markets moving in response to the Fed not the realities of the economy…