This post is excerpted from Mises’ “The Causes of the Economic Crisis and Other Essays Before and After the Great Depression” which is available to buy here and download here. Both Andreas Acavalos and Toby Baxendale supported the production of this book.
Emphasis mine.
On covering government deficits by creating new money (pp 2-3):
If the practice persists of covering government deficits with the issue of notes, then the day will come without fail, sooner or later, when the monetary systems of those nations pursuing this course will break down completely. The purchasing power of the monetary unit will decline more and more, until finally it disappears completely. To be sure, one could conceive of the possibility that the process of monetary depreciation could go on forever. The purchasing power of the monetary unit could become increasingly smaller without ever disappearing entirely. Prices would then rise more and more. It would still continue to be possible to exchange notes for commodities. Finally, the situation would reach such a state that people would be operating with billions and trillions and then even higher sums for small transactions. The monetary system would still continue to function. However, this prospect scarcely resembles reality.
On credit expansion by banks, its effects on the economy and the ensuing crisis (pp 113-115):
The crisis breaks out only when the banks alter their conduct to the extent that they discontinue issuing any more new fiduciary media and stop undercutting the “natural interest rate.” They may even take steps to restrict circulation credit. When they actually do this, and why, is still to be examined. First of all, however, we must ask ourselves whether it is possible for the banks to stay on the course upon which they have embarked, permitting new quantities of fiduciary media to flow into circulation continuously and proceeding always to make loans below the rate of interest which would prevail on the market in the absence of their interference with newly created fiduciary media.
If the banks could proceed in this manner, with businesses improving continually, could they then provide for lasting good times? Would they then be able to make the boom eternal?
They cannot do this. The reason they cannot is that inflationism carried on ad infinitum is not a workable policy. If the issue of fiduciary media is expanded continuously, prices rise ever higher and at the same time the positive price premium also rises. (We shall disregard the fact that consideration for (1) the continually declining monetary reserves relative to fiduciary media and (2) the banks’ operating costs must sooner or later compel them to discontinue the further expansion of circulation credit.) It is precisely because, and only because, no end to the prolonged “flood” of expanding fiduciary media is foreseen, that it leads to still sharper price increases and, finally, to a panic in which prices and the loan rate move erratically upward.
Suppose the banks still did not want to give up the race? Suppose, in order to depress the loan rate, they wanted to satisfy the continuously expanding desire for credit by issuing still more circulation credit? Then they would only hasten the end, the collapse of the entire system of fiduciary media. The inflation can continue only so long as the conviction persists that it will one day cease. Once people are persuaded that the inflation will not stop, they turn from the use of this money. They flee then to “real values,” foreign money, the precious metals, and barter.
Sooner or later, the crisis must inevitably break out as the result of a change in the conduct of the banks. The later the crack-up comes, the longer the period in which the calculation of the entrepreneurs is misguided by the issue of additional fiduciary media. The greater this additional quantity of fiduciary money, the more factors of production have been firmly committed in the form of investments which appeared profitable only because of the artificially reduced interest rate and which prove to be unprofitable now that the interest rate has again been raised.
Great losses are sustained as a result of misdirected capital investments. Many new structures remain unfinished. Others, already completed, close down operations. Still others are carried on because, after writing off losses which represent a waste of capital, operation of the existing structure pays at least something.
The crisis, with its unique characteristics, is followed by stagnation. The misguided enterprises and businesses of the boom period are already liquidated. Bankruptcy and adjustment have cleared up the situation. The banks have become cautious. They fight shy of expanding circulation credit. They are not inclined to give an ear to credit applications from schemers and promoters. Not only is the artificial stimulus to business, through the expansion of circulation credit, lacking, but even businesses which would be feasible, considering the capital goods available, are not attempted because the general feeling of discouragement makes every innovation appear doubtful. Prevailing “money interest rates” fall below the “natural interest rates.”
When the crisis breaks out, loan rates bound sharply upward because threatened enterprises offer extremely high interest rates for the funds to acquire the resources, with the help of which they hope to save themselves. Later, as the panic subsides, a situation develops, as a result of the restriction of circulation credit and attempts to dispose of large inventories, causing prices [and the “money interest rate”] to fall steadily and leading to the appearance of a negative price premium. This reduced rate of loan interest is adhered to for some time, even after the decline in prices comes to a standstill, when a negative price premium no longer corresponds to conditions. Thus, it comes about that the “money interest rate” is lower than the “natural rate.” Yet, because the unfortunate experiences of the recent crisis have made everyone uneasy, the incentive to business activity is not as strong as circumstances would otherwise warrant. Quite a time passes before capital funds, increased once again by savings accumulated in the meantime, exert sufficient pressure on the loan interest rate for an expansion of entrepreneurial activity to resume. With this development, the low point is passed and the new boom begins.
Politicians and bankers would do well to head the more than 200-year old words of Patrick Henry in his infamous “Give me liberty of give me death” speech:
“Mr. President, it is natural to man to indulge in the illusions of hope. We are apt to shut our eyes against a painful truth, and listen to the song of that siren till she transforms us into beasts. Is this the part of wise men, engaged in a great and arduous struggle for liberty? Are we disposed to be of the number of those who, having eyes, see not, and, having ears, hear not, the things which so nearly concern their temporal salvation? For my part, whatever anguish of spirit it may cost, I am willing to know the whole truth; to know the worst, and to provide for it.”
Today, if politicians and bankers merely channeled the same amount of energy that they expend in deceiving the people into fixing the monetary system, then perhaps they would have already come up with a viable solution by now. To have the slightest fighting chance of resolving this crisis with a solution that benefits the people, politicians and bankers must be courageous enough to tell the public the worst of the truth and to provide for it. But fraud, and perpetuation of an illusion seems to be their only concern today. And with good reason. After all, as illustrated by a recent Center on Budget and Policy Priorities study, they are the only ones benefiting from this fraud. From 2002 to 2007, the top 1% of Americans captured nearly 70% of the income gains in America. Today, in my opinion, today, the number one reason why the vast majority of people still cannot except the possibility that we will soon enter into a second phase of this global economic crisis that will prove to be far worse than the financial disruptions we experienced in 2008 is the following: Most people alive today have no memory of the Great Depression. For those that do, certainly they are able to identify with much greater clarity, the similarities in the patterns of fraud back then and the patterns of fraud occurring today.
A bank , building society that uses factional reserves, lends long and pays out short is only going to exist should confidence be kept in it. The “Run on the Rock” in the summer of 2007 saw people queuing to get their cash out of the Northern Rock which resulted in the first systematic run on a bank since the 1866 run on the Overend, Gurney & Company bank in the UK.
Readers of this site will know that a bank can only exist with the legal and accounting privilege that allows them to use current creditors – i.e. the depositors of the Presbyterian Mutual Society (PMS) – to lend out a multiple number of times to property loans and other entrepreneurial loans. Readers will also know that when they deposit money they in effect lend it to the bank and become a creditor to the bank. A deposit of cash into a bank/Mutual means you as the depositee lend money to the bank/Mutual That is, to be very clear, when you deposit, you cease to own the money – the bank does. This was established by law in 1811 in Carr V Carr and reaffirmed in Foley V Hill 1846.
The History
The Society’s audited accounts for the year ended 31st March 2008 showed £305m of loans and £5m of liquid assets to pay up to £310m on demand deposits. So one can deduce that there was only £5m of cash supporting £310m IOUs to its creditors, the depositors. This means that the PMS multiplied its credit creation to the tune of 62 times! This is nearly twice the average of all the banks licensed by the Bank of England. In fairness to the Society, they did pay out £21m before they were left with only £5m of cash, so £26m of cash was in their vaults when the run happened. Thus a more conservative 12 x credit was created out of thin air or a leverage ratio of 1 part cash to 12 parts credit existed in this Society.
A quick refresher on how the banking system allows this creation of credit out of thin air can be found here http://www.cobdencentre.org/2010/02/a-day-of-reckoning/ where I say, “ It is often forgotten but when you place £1m in a savings account (in cash) in say the Royal Bank of Scotland, which has no legal reserve requirement, they then lend £970k (in credit) , keeping on average 3% of cash back in reserves, to an entrepreneur in say HSBC, who then deposits that money in HSBC. We now have one claim to the original £1m and one claim to the £970k. The money supply has moved from £1m to £1.97m – just like magic! This is credit expansion.
The reality is that across all the banks in the United Kingdom licensed by the Bank of England, we have for every £1 of money (in cash), £34 in claims to money (credit)!”
The Administrators’ report tells the sorry story of events in summary which I list underneath, but one glaring fact is omitted. This is that the very Government of the UK actually triggered the loss of confidence in this Bank. When our Prime Minister in his own words was “saving the world” he ordered a full guarantee , government backed, on all deposits. The PMS, which had 10,000 members, went into administration following a rush by savers to withdraw their money at the height of the banking crisis in October 2008. People withdrew their money as they learned the Society was not covered by the government’s bank deposit guarantee scheme. Previously they were content to leave their money in the Society. For the purposes of this article, it is not needed to debate the point: was it or was it not a bank that should have been supported by this guarantee? The salient point being that not being guaranteed scared people into making withdrawals where little existed before.
“the demand for withdrawals by members of their investments exceeded its cash reserves;”
“the members’ investments were historically withdrawable on demand but the cash was invested by the Society in longer term investments such as property and loans.”
“For the Society to allow members to withdraw their investments on demand and invest members’ money in longer term investments, the Society required a high degree of confidence among its members that their investments were secure. However this confidence has been severely tested by the current economic climate and eventually the demand by members for withdrawals exceeded the Society’s cash reserves. …I believe it will be difficult for the Society in its current form to continue as a going concern.”
“loan capital will be treated as creditors and will therefore be paid in preference to members’ shares.”
“Government Guarantee
As you will be aware the Society does not benefit from the deposit guarantee scheme.
During the month of October 2008 the Society experienced an unprecedented increase in the number of requests for repayment of members’ investments. It was common practice for the Society to repay investments on receipt of a request, and payments of £21 million were made up to Friday 24th October 2008, leaving £4 million in the Society’s bank account.
An emergency meeting of the Society’s Board of Directors was convened on 25th October 2008 and it was resolved that:
…the 21 day notice period for the repayment of members’ investments be invoked in respect of requests received from members as at that date and any new requests received from members.
On 6th November 2008 the Society’s Board of Directors met again and it was reported that the demand among the Society’s members to withdraw their investments had increased which further exacerbated the Society’s liquidity. It was also reported at this meeting that legal proceedings had been commenced by three members seeking repayment of their investments. It was resolved by the Society’s Board of Directors on 6th November 2008 that the Society should be placed into Administration so that its assets could be protected, subject to enabling legislation being passed to permit the Society to go into administration.
During the period 27th October 2008 to 17th November 2008, the Society had received requests for withdrawals in excess of £50 million but the Society had cash reserves of only £4 million to meet such requests.”
Now this would have been the story of every bank in the UK if the government had not acted as it did as we were ‘panicking’ as a nation. We should also note that all banks are in the same precarious situation as the PMS was with regard to lending long and paying out short still, to this day. Do we need to live like this?
The Future Safe Way to Run Banks and Provide Interest for Savers and Lending to the needs of Trade.
If banks were mandated to hold 100% reserves of cash in their vaults, they could issue their bank statements saying what they owe you each month and you would know that you actually had cash in the vault to support your deposit that is represented by your bank statement. The bank statement after all is only a thing that would more accurately be called a “bank IOU statement.” Should you want interest you could ask for the cash you have deposited to be placed in a highly liquid government bond that could be converted into cash when you need it, paying you a rate of interest. Should you want a higher rate of interest, you can lend your money i.e. cease ownership and place in a bond that has in turn been lent to an entrepreneur for 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 5 years etc with the highest rate of interest being given for the longer term locked away and lent to somebody.
The Solution for Paying Out 100% of the PMS Depositors’ Lost Money- £310m – Now, Today
Following the work of 5 Nobel Prize winners and the founder of the American Chicago School, I would suggest the following written about in the Day of Reckoning article;
The Bank of England immediately issues notes to cover all the deposits i.e. redeem all the depositors for 100% cash notes and coins to be placed in their accounts. Please note, this costs the Bank of England the price of paper and the ink and nothing else and IS NOT INFLATIONARY and generates no liability to the UK taxpayer – see next point.
At the same time, get the administrator of the PMS to delete all current creditors (the depositors) as these have now been redeemed from the bank’s books by the Bank of England. The deleting of these bank obligations means that the money the depositors did lend on deposit to the PSM no longer exists, so for the sake of argument, if there was £310m of deposits, these have been redeemed in cash by the Bank of England and the equivalent amount of deposits have been removed from the money supply. Cost to the Bank of England = zero and cost to the UK tax payer = zero. Money supply stays the same.
The PMS in administration now has only assets i.e. loans from entrepreneurs /people who are repaying the loans or mortgages. These can now continue to get repaid, but instead of paying the creditors of the PMS, there are now none, so these loans can go into paying off the National Debt.
This way all parties win.
A courageous politician in Northern Ireland or in mainland GB could well put forward a Private Members’ bill which could be the first legislative move to establishing Honest Money.
The Day of Reckoning article linked to above provides the start of the legislative solution to the whole UK wide banking system whose model is sadly no different to that of the little PMS.
The Bank of England entered unchartered territory in January last year when the Treasury authorised it to begin a radical monetary policy experiment that we now know as “Quantitative Easing”. Given the unprecedented monetary conditions resulting from the liquidity crisis, the Asset Purchase Facility has been welcomed with open arms, and now stands at almost £200bn invested in UK gilts and corporate debt. But has QE had an economic impact to match its political use? Will the cure prove as dangerous as the disease? How and when should the Bank close the lid on this potential Pandora’s Box?”
Several leading economic figures including Roger Bootle, Tim Congdon and Allister Heath, chaired by Policy Exchange’s Chief Economist, Andrew Lilico, will debate and discuss the merits of quantitative easing, the exit strategies for the Bank of England, the main challenges the UK’s economy will face as a result of the program in 2010 and beyond, and how policymakers should face them.”
These are my notes:
Tim Congdon spoke first , this basic message was that unless money supply, primarily bank deposits, is kept very tight and only moderately growing, there will be trouble ahead with boom or bust. QE has kept the economy on the road and the money supply has not fallen. He acknowledges that there were some problems in measuring this.
Roger Bootle second, he opened by accusing one of our columnist, Liam Halligan of being intellectually devoid of any understanding of economics as he viewed Liam’s world to be predicated on massive inflation and a bond strike and this would never happen. He also said that QE could happen an infinitum. I tell no lie, this is what he said. In fact he was of the view that this should go on and on for whatever amount of time until we were out of trouble. People needed to believe that this policy was going to be the policy that would sort out the economy and indeed he agreed with Krugman, that crude of all the crude Keynesians, that Japan had actually done too little to stop the ongoing deflation. The UK’s risk was never going to be inflation but deflation.
Allister Heath opened with saying he reluctantly supported QE as the key thing was to stop a monetary deflation but questioned why we were having a debate in the first place about the merits of QE and should we do more etc when we should be questioning why do we inflation targeting ? As this has given us the biggest boom and bust in living memory should we not dispense with this independent Bank of England , FSA and other so called control bodies and centralise further into one overall controlling body that controls the broad money supply?
I was utterly bemused by all this tosh spoken in the name of economics with glimmers of hope only coming from Allister Heath.
The chairman asked three questions and the audience were asked three questions with one follow up.
I asked “in business I create wealth by making my factors of production work more efficiently to produce more goods and services. I invariably have to lengthen the structure of my production by saving and investing this money in new and more efficient kit to produce more of my goods and services for better prices and service level for my customers. With those goods I can exchange them with other entrepreneurs, shop keepers etc for my basic food, rent for my roof over my head etc via the medium of money. Money is bits of paper in this country and an electronic bank deposit, so having more of the bits of paper and banks deposits to exchange for the same goods and services would only mean my purchasing power had been debased, so no wealth would have been created. I thought this question go to the heart of the matter.
The second was about bond yields – had they or had they not moved up or down.
The third as about what the panel thought about the questioner’s view that we could only get out of this mess via and export related recovery.
Peter Bottomley asked a question that I cannot remember.
The Chairman then had another round of questions.
Mine was relegated to the bottom by the Chairman. Roger Bootle thought it should be answered by Tim Congdon and in the end Allister Heath did give an answer which acknowledged that no wealth could be created by paper alone and that there was a large body of work in Mises and Hayek showing that the creation of credit causes boom and bust . He was reluctant to support QE as it at least kept money supply near static as opposed to imploding, but saw no ability for it to create wealth . I was not allowed time to debate this with Allister , but did mention afterwards that as he said to me, the Austrian School was divided between those who would support a printing of money to offset a fall in V and those who would just advocate a deflation to allow the market to clear at new lower prices. Having to go I should have added, there is a third camp based around the Cobden Centre who would advocate 100% reserves as this would fix the money supply and you can never have a run on the bank with 100% reserves in place. This is explained here http://www.cobdencentre.org/2010/02/a-day-of-reckoning/ .
Allister framed his discussion in the mainstream language of the Quantity Theory of Money, more I suspect to engage with his fellow economists rather than he having any belief in it being more than a tautology. For a refutation of the Quantity Theory see here http://www.cobdencentre.org/2009/09/qe-errors/ . I did point out at the end after the event had finished that if V went down, how could me selling a house to someone, real bricks and mortar exchanging for money and having it sold back to me for the same 10 times create any wealth? Yes we can increase the velocity of the circulation of money by doing daft things like I describe, but Allister accepted nothing like wealth creation will come of it.
The medium of exchange will not create wealth on its own. It is not wealth. If you hold these bits of paper you hold claims to wealth. The retained goods and the savings we have are wealth. The whole capital infrastructure of our companies and private balance sheets are wealth . This infrastructure drives wealth creation via the dynamic entrepreneurial spirit of men of action who mix the factors of production into the most efficient combinations to satisfy the most amounts of needs. No small matter of printing paper that facilitates exchange or adding electronic reserves to banks will make that wealth creation process any easier. The second part of this article explains how wealth is created http://www.cobdencentre.org/2009/09/can-the-manipulation-of-interest-rates-create-wealth/ .
BJ’s excellent article today rightly draws comparison between the bailout of Greece and the bailout of Northern Rock.
He makes the excellent point that we should be grateful that the myth of monetary union without federalism is now starkly exposed.
His own shortcoming is that he does not quite understand the seriousness of the banking crisis and therefore his article ends at the crisis point with no solution apparent to the UK’s Greeklike problem, other than the implied debauching of the currency.
Without reform along the simple lines advocated by the Cobden Centre I fear that, even outside the Euro, the banking system may crash again.
The credit default swap sneaked up on everybody, becoming a $62 trillion market, without anyone outside the business knowing much about it. As the Bear Stearns, Lehman and AIG debacles revealed, these instruments also involved highly non-transparent credit risks of their own. As a holder of a CDS you don’t know whether your counterparty has issued only a few of your CDS, in which case you’ll probably get paid in a bankruptcy, or whether he has issued fifty times the outstanding debt you’re trying to hedge, in which case you’re unlikely to get paid.
And moreover:
Financial engineering’s benefit to the global economy is highly questionable and the proliferation of financially-engineered products of recent years has brought few benefits and led to huge losses for society at large. As we have seen, one quarter’s bad losses in late 2008 wiped out all the accumulated financial engineering profits of the last quarter century and saddled taxpayers with a bill for hundreds of billions, if not more.
Prof. Dowd has kindly agreed to pre-release two chapters through The Cobden Centre:
Alert readers will have already picked up some of the advice we would give investors and clients of financial institutions:
take a longer-term perspective and return to investment rather than speculation;
do not seek to ‘enhance’ yields, because this always exposes investors to hidden costs and risks, whilst firms seeking finance should resist cutting corners on their financing costs, for the same reason; thus, both parties should be realistic in their expectations;
avoid frequent trading, focus on static over dynamic strategies, buy and hold over activist portfolio management;
pay more attention to costs and hidden charges, and work on the assumption that higher charges are usually a good signal of a bad deal;
distrust commission-based salespeople;
if you use derivatives, be clear why and use them only for risk management and not speculation;
avoid complicated opaque products; and
do not take liquidity for granted and ensure that your liquidity is protected in a crisis.
Besides this motherhood and apple pie stuff, investors should also be careful of correlation-based investment and risk management strategies, which work well when not needed but are apt to break down when they are. This is not to suggest that they should give up on diversification. People understood diversification long before Modern Portfolio Theory, but they tended to practice it differently and more wisely. Diversification was assessed by committees of experienced practitioners, who took a long-term view and relied on their judgment rather than unreliable correlation estimates – a far cry from modern practices of modern fund management, with its obsession with short-term performance assessment
Investors should demand transparency. Perhaps the most sobering lesson we have learned since the subprime crisis broke is the benefit of transparency in business dealings. Time after time, when a fiasco has occurred, a key contributing factors has lack of transparency. Subprime mortgages, CDOs and credit default swaps were all financial innovations that relied crucially on nobody asking too many questions. So too with the vast Madoff Ponzi scheme, involving some of the most sophisticated investors in the world, which rested on the same fatal human omission.
The restoration of a rational and stable financial system inevitably requires major reform on a number of fronts. History gives much guidance here and also a role model: the period we should seek to emulate is the nineteenth century. Then money was sound, the dominant currency of the time, the pound, was literally as good as gold, while financial institutions were conservative and generally stable, and an altogether healthier financial ethos reigned.
It is very common these days to sneer at the gold standard: after all, it was Keynes who once dismissed it as “a relic from a barbarous age”. We would suggest, on the contrary, that a gold standard or some suitably 21st Century commodity equivalent would be highly desirable, and put an end to the disastrous century-long experiment with fiat money and its attendant miseries of inflation and monetary instability. The fact that Keynes opposed the gold standard is a further reason to support it.
The nineteenth century model would also entail major reforms to financial institutions and the regulatory system: greater liability and greater responsibility, the repeal of deposit insurance and investor protection legislation and the abolition of the big financial regulatory bodies such as the SEC and FSA. And by nineteenth century standards, we really mean early nineteenth century standards, those that pertained to the period before the Bank Charter Act of 1844 and the Companies Act of 1862, when liability was very real.
As for the banking system, we would suggest that the role model is Scotland pre-1845, when the Scottish banking system was virtually free of state control, unhindered by a central bank, and equally admired and envied across the world – and copied by countries such as Canada and Australia. In all three countries, free banking systems operated highly successful for very long periods of time. Indeed, the Canadian system was widely admired in the United States – and many US reformers in the late nineteenth century saw it as their ideal. The Canadian system was highly stable – apart from the failures of two small Alberta banks in 1985, its last notable bank failure was that of the Home Bank of Canada back in 1923. There were no Canadian bank failures in the 1930s and, even after the establishment of the Bank of Canada in 1934, many still regard the Canadian banking system as the best in the world.
Our first choice environment would be one with a commodity standard, free banking (no central bank) and financial laissez-faire, restrictions on the use of the “limited liability” corporate form and the most limited government. Even if we don’t return all the way to these early nineteenth century standards (and we can imagine the opposition!), we should still move as much as possible in that direction, though we would not advocate the reintroduction of the notorious debtors’ prisons immortalized in the fiction of Charles Dickens! However, our proposed reforms herein are adapted to the “second best world” (if it’s actually that; it may be about thousandth best of all the ‘parallel universe’ possibilities) in which we live, with relatively large government, a fiat currency and a central bank.
The most important institutional policy that must be solved is that of an excessively expansionary monetary policy. Simply making the monetary authority “independent” does not achieve this if the monetary authority retains its interactions with politicians and the financial community, both of which want loose money. The ideal to aim at is a hard money Fed, a Paul Volcker Fed.
Leaders of countries in the eurozone on Thursday promised to help Greece if it slashed its budget deficit, saying they would provide “determined and co-ordinated action if needed to safeguard stability” in the bloc.
The future of the euro is dark because there are such strong incentives for reckless fiscal behavior, not only for Greece but also for other countries. Some of them are in situations similar Greece’s. In Spain, official unemployment is approaching 20% and public deficit is 11.4% of GDP. Portugal announced a plan to privatize national assets as its deficit is at 9.3% of GDP. Ireland’s housing bubble burst with a deficit of 11.5% of GDP.
And further:
What is the future of the euro? As we have seen, the inherent incentives in the eurozone encourage destruction of the currency because deficit costs are externalized. Therefore, there are three main possibilities.
The Stability and Growth Pact is finally enforced. Unfortunately, strong political resistance makes this possibility unlikely.
The more conservative member states refuse to continue bailing out the more profligate ones. The economically stronger states force the weaker ones to enter bankruptcy and to leave the monetary union.
Countries continue to increase their deficits, attempting to externalize the costs. They yield to the incentives and participate in a spending race, leading to a hyperinflation; and the euro moves closer to collapse.
In the UK the government seems to think the world owes it a living. The administration thinks it can carry on borrowing, with the global money lenders happily paying the bills for the excess public spending. The main difference between Greece and the UK is that Greece belongs to Euroland and expects the EU to bail it out, whilst the UK is outside, and can put off adjustment a bit by devaluing its currency.
The British political debate is shifting. But not nearly fast enough. The gilts market is watching very closely. If there isn’t genuine action soon, or at least a rock solid and credible commitment to action, traders will lose patience and bid-up gilt yields sharply. In a crippling ripple effect, borrowing costs would spike right across the economy. Sterling could even collapse.
My good friend Nick Cowen has just emailed me the video link to an excellent talk given recently at Oxford by TCC Advisory Board member Jamie Whyte. Called ‘The Financial Crisis: too much freedom or too much regulation?’ it is well worth your time.
The Financial Times has an item up about the weight of investor pressure to sell the euro, taking the view, no doubt, that the financial crisis affecting debt-laden Greece could raise the chances of a breakdown in the single currency bloc:
Traders and hedge funds have bet nearly $8bn (€5.9bn) against the euro, amassing the biggest ever short position in the single currency on fears of a eurozone debt crisis.
What interests me about this saga are not the specifics of the Greek financial debacle – which is, in my view, a particularly egregious example of fiscal incontinence by that country’s government – but rather what the FT story tells us about the benefits of short-selling.
The practice of shorting, which describes the process of temporarily borrowing a financial instrument such as a currency, selling it and repurchasing it at a cheaper price to pocket a profit, has sometimes been politically attacked. About two years ago, the UK government decided that those wicked investors who had been shorting the securities of banks such as HBOS needed to be warned off. It was if the very idea of seeking to profit by taking a negative view of a stock or bond was “unpatriotic”. In their defence, policymakers might argue that they were trying to prevent frenzied attacks on a company or country, but all too often, attacks on shorting turn out to be a classic case of “kill the messenger”. I hold no great admiration for George Soros, given his political views, but he certainly did the UK a favour, in my view, in shorting the pound in 1992, a process that eventually helped drive the UK out of the European fixed exchange rate system at the time.
Likewise, in the latest example of foreign exchange drama, traders who are shorting the euro are sending out a powerful message: this currency has a great big flaw in it. Can, for example, the relatively big economies of Germany and France be expected to bail out Greece in the way that say, the Federal US government might have to bail out California, a state that has been teetering on the brink of collapse for months? Such a bailout would only raise the question of whether countries doing the bailing out were entitled to have a more direct say about the fiscal policies of a member state.
Healthy Shorting, in any event, is part of a healthy, liquid financial market. Without those who are willing to sell, buyers cannot operate (a point so obvious that I feel a bit embarrassed to have to even mention this on this site). If we want efficient price discovery to work in markets, then it should be possible for operators to profit not just from when a price rises, but when it falls. Shorting can enable financial players to hedge risks.
Of course, part of the issue for those monitoring the markets is that the routes by which an investor can short a stock have multiplied. You don’t have to be a big hedge fund with access to a powerful prime broker such as Morgan Stanley or Deutsche Bank. You can, for example, short a security through derivative-type products such as contracts for difference (CFDs) and spread-betting, both of which are instruments open to the retail investor, given certain constraints. These processes can be accessed online via firms such as IG Index, for example.
So armed with such instruments, traders can express a bearish, as well as bullish, opinion. And the FT story is striking about what the euro bears think. For example, the report says that traders and hedge funds have bet nearly $8bn (€5.9bn) against the euro, “amassing the biggest ever short position in the single currency on fears of a eurozone debt crisis”.
Figures from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, which are often used as a proxy of hedge fund activity, showed investors had increased their positions against the euro to record levels in the week to February 2.
It has been one of the ironies of the financial turmoil that when problems first arose, it was easy for the European nations such as Germany and France to hint that their systems were so much more robust than the approach taken by those cowboy Anglo Saxons. But in truth, EU countries, many of which now have levels of debt that are alarming investors, have big problems. Short-sellers are simply expressing the wider worries that investors have about the viability of the euro and the willingness of euro zone states to operate a sound currency.
This post is excerpted from Mises’ “The Causes of the Economic Crisis and Other Essays Before and After the Great Depression” which is available to buy here and download here. Both Andreas Acavalos and Toby Baxendale supported the production of this book.
