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By Toby Baxendale, on 11 March 10
Why Even the Best Banks are Insolvent and Inherently Dishonest
We are told that Barclays is a good bank and it did well not to take the taxpayers shilling. We are told that it has recovered and is prospering and this indeed is a sign of the economic recovery.
Part of the mission of the Honest Money Movement is to explore and expose these fallacies.
Banks only exist with entrenched legal and accountancy privilege. Privilege for all sectors of the political spectrum is a bad thing. Trade Union privilege to operate a closed shop cuts back on employment and price gouges the customers who buy the goods that the closed shop workers produce. A group of countries who restrict the price of say oil will push up the price of oil and gouge their customers and so on and so forth. All privilege is bad.
Contrast Normal Commercial Activity…
Any business in this country from the plumber to BP will have current creditors, those people it owes money to such as suppliers and current debtors, those people who owe it money for the goods and services sold. It is a legal offense to not pay your assets and your liabilities as and when they fall due. Indeed as a company director you become personally liable should you trade in this position whilst you are insolvent.
…With That of a Bank
A bank has current creditors: on the whole, these are people like you and me who have our salaries or savings paid or deposited into our accounts on our behalf. We do not actually “own our money” that is deposited in the bank. The bank does.
This may come as a surprise to you. However this is a very well established point of law. Since 1811 in Carr v Carr, this has been the case. So you and I are the current creditors to the bank i.e. we are owed money by the bank. In fact your bank statement is just an IOU from the bank acknowledging that it owes you however much it says on the statement on demand.
The assets of the bank are those people to whom the bank has lent its (formerly your) money to i.e. all the borrowers of loans. As has been so clearly displayed during this crisis, they have lent their money out (formerly yours) over 33 times on average to borrowers. I explain the money credit creation multiplier here for a refresher on understanding this process. So when more than 1 of 33 of us wish to withdraw our money that is on demand, the bank can not pay it back as it does not have it.
In enclose a link to the balance sheet of the UK’s largest company, BP here here. Page 106 has the balance sheet.
| Non-current assets |
£161,854M |
| Current assets |
£66,384M |
| Total Assets |
£228,238M |
| Current liabilities |
£69,793M |
| Non Current liabilities |
£136,129M |
| Net Assets |
£92,109M |
This would suggest that BP has current liabilities marginally greater than their current assets. No doubt the timing of the payment to suppliers is carefully balanced off otherwise their auditors could not sign off the accounts if they thought the company could not pay off its assets as and when they fall due.
Contrast this with the Barclays Bank full year 2009 results shown on this spreadsheet.
See tab 4 where we have the consolidated balance sheet. There are just assets and liabilities and there is not a distinction in their accounts between current liabilities i.e. your and my money that has been deposited that is on demand now and a long term liability such as a mortgage to pay off a loan on some property they may occupy etc over a long period of time. There is £322 billion of money on deposit in current creditors that could be withdrawn “on demand” as that is what the bank tells you that you can do with it. Indeed you only deposit it that way because you need to make sure payments happen on demand. They have no requirement to provide you with the ability to make this happen despite the fact that you may have deposited money there!
So unlike BP and any commercial business from the lowest one man band plumber to the mighty BP, who have to account for keeping payments set aside to cover their current liabilities, a bank is not required to. Indeed, it is specifically allowed not to by accounting law and legal privilege under law. If the deposit base of Barclays wanted what it thought was “its” money back i.e. it wanted the £322 billion redeemed into cash or taken out of the bank and moved to another, then as there is no corresponding current asset to pay for this. Only assets that have long term payment implications. Barclays by its very nature is inherently insolvent and can only exist by this accounting / legal privilege that does not apply to any other non bank business in the UK!
One of the first things you will ever learn in a law of contract course is that an agreement is reached between parties and a contract established when an offer is accepted with a mirror image of understanding , from the Latin “pacta sunt servanda” or agreements must be kept. So it would strike me that as the vast majority of people think that they deposit their money and it remains their money in a bank and that the law and accounting standards say otherwise, there is a very good argument that there is not a contract in place between any depositor and bank. Certainly as most depositors also want easy access.
I commissioned a survey for the Cobden Centre in Oct 2009 with ICM over 2,000 people in conjunction with a student research project at the European School of Management. 74% of people think that they are the legal owner of the money in their current account rather than the bank. Paradoxically 61% know that their money is lent out even tough 67% want convenient (now) on demand access. The full results of this survey will be published shortly in another paper.
Now we can understand how the banks have the biggest salaries, the biggest bonuses , the biggest offices, the most plush terms and conditions of employment and so on and so forth. If you do not have to provide for your creditors then you can use their money to do what you like with and this is what happens!
Just to give you an idea what this would mean for me in my company Seafood Holdings Ltd if I was allowed to do what the banks are allowed to do. As of December 2009, I had trade current creditors of £8.276m against trade debtors of £12.275m. If I was a bank, I could pick up the full £8.276m and pay a dividend or bonus and still be lawful. I could build a megalomaniac size corporate head office and stick a gold plated statue with me dressed in a Roman Caesar like uniform to please my demented ego! I could behave like the worst most vulgar of City bankers.
We must always remember their key service other than the safe keeping of our money is to act as an intermediary between saver and borrower. This is “Captain Mannering” style boring banking. Like and estate agent who mediates between buyer and seller of houses, he has a High Street presence like most providing a consumer service . Places like the City of London / Canary Wharf and Wall Street etc can only exist as they do today on this legal privilege and on the welfare state of credit whereby we allow them to exist at the tax payers’ expense.
By Toby Baxendale, on 10 March 10
Some of my City friends who work in banking have had a look at the 20009 Barclays balance sheet and made comment on how the profits are made up.
They report to me that the one off profit from the disposal of BGI to Blackrock was £6.3bn. Add that to the trading profit of £7bn and you get 130% of the total profit of this “bank.”
Accounting like this is like Manchester United selling top player Ronaldo in the last financial year for £80 million when the average sale of a player in the football world produces only £1 – £5 million and kidding themselves that this is a result of them trading profitably in a sustainable way. It seems unlikely that shareholders in this football club will be relying on a spectacular cash event occurring each year as a regular occurrence. Therefore, many analysts are inclined to deduct from the profits such one off events to get a better view of predictable stable cashflow. (see tab 18 of the spreadsheet previously mentioned in yesterdays article and downloaded from here, http://group.barclays.com/Investor-Relations/Financial-results-and-publications/Results-announcements ).
Further, I’m told that a brief review of the numbers indicates that £7bn of the £10.2bn profits are expressed as “trading income” (last year £1.3bn).
I would pose three questions:
a) What if the markets had gone the other way? Would we be told these are not real cash losses?
b) How many politicians that want Glass Steagall separation of retail banking from casino banking will criticise them?
The political class want both the cake and to eat it, or they are just ignorant.
They now doubt are content that 74% of the TOTAL ASSETS of Barclays sit in Barclays Capital – the investment banking or casino arm..
c) Let’s have a look at bonuses – having slashed cost income ratios from 76% q4 08 to 55% q1 09, ratio is now back up at 64% q4 09. Is this what the political class meant when they wanted to see a more equitable salary to profit ratio?
Let us also consider the consequences of mark to market accounting FOR P&L PROFITS. The wisdom of MTM for balance sheet and transparency is not in dispute, but in a government bailout environment, the profit and loss accounts of banks is boosted artificially by the very bailout itself. The effect of interest rates being forced down from 5% to 0.5% artificially boosts the mark to market value of any unhedged long term assets on trading book. I urge you to think about what imputed capital value you have on an income stream today with interest rates at 0.5% as against an interest rate of say 5%, they work in inverse proportion i.e. the lower the rate the higher the capital value. A property generating rent of £1,000 per week, should be multiplied by 200 times to get its capital value or the value of its income stream. A little bit Alice in Wonderland I am sure you will agree.
Bonuses should not be paid on these numbers because the “profits” are unrealised, and will turn to huge losses if interest rates go up as they are still unhedged, remember! The bankers are making sure they can take a bonus on 30 years implied profits today in this low welfare state of credit environment with you and me, aka the taxpayer paying for it.
Let me explain in another way. MTM accounting takes a payment due in the future, say £100 after 1 year, and “discounts this by the interest rate to value the payment today taking into account the delay and the cost of money. So if rates are 5% in this simple example then the MTM value today is a shade over £95, since £95 invested at 5% for 1 year will produce about £100. If the interest rate is 0%, then the MTM value is £100. Therefore, the reduction in interest rates increases the MTM value of payments due in the future..
I question the long term value to profits of:
1) buying alphabet soup bombed out CLOs CDOs, CDO squared structures and funding them at 0.5% courtesy of the taxpayer via the Band of England Discount Window.
The Discount Window remember is being used as the lender of last resort in the banking system and has been very active since the October 2008 crash with us the taxpayer subsidizing all of this!
2) Present valuing (ie booking to p&l as if realised, earned income today) under synthetic (credit default swap) structures of say 30 year loan margins as day 1 profits.
For a more detailed explanation see Gordon Kerr’s presentation March 2nd at the European Parliament reported on this site as “Iceland and the Western Banking System”
http://www.cobdencentre.org/2010/03/iceland-and-the-western-banking-system/
Allister Heath (City AM) further notes that the accounts declare that cost of capital is 12% but return on capital employed is 8% – “shocking – makes no sense” is the comment.
Surely is not Barclays Bank effectively operating as a hedge fund with a modest high street retail bank attached?
I have only the following comment to make on this. If Barclays wants to list in the Caymans and invite me to invest in its shares, that is capitalism operating perfectly in a free market.
Where the Cobden Centre takes issue with this is the operation of the free market being distorted by taxpayer intervention. It is surely unacceptable for the taxpayer to be asked to:
a) underwrite the solvency of this hedge fund,
b) fund it through the Bank of England’s discount window, and
c) pay its employees bonuses based on asset valuations that not even a hedge fund at the racier end would attempt to classify as profits.
Any hedge fund with a cost of capital of 12% and a return on capital of 8% would be asking its “partners” (ie employees) to inject more money to evidence commitment or ’skin in the game’…as the hedgies in Mayfair term it.
So much for the new found stability of our banking system. Our noney system continues to get more dishonest every day.
By Steven Baker, on 8 March 10
Via James Tyler and zero hedge, The Fastest Growing Export of the Western Banking Industry is Fraud:
Politicians and bankers would do well to head the more than 200-year old words of Patrick Henry in his infamous “Give me liberty of give me death” speech:
“Mr. President, it is natural to man to indulge in the illusions of hope. We are apt to shut our eyes against a painful truth, and listen to the song of that siren till she transforms us into beasts. Is this the part of wise men, engaged in a great and arduous struggle for liberty? Are we disposed to be of the number of those who, having eyes, see not, and, having ears, hear not, the things which so nearly concern their temporal salvation? For my part, whatever anguish of spirit it may cost, I am willing to know the whole truth; to know the worst, and to provide for it.”
Today, if politicians and bankers merely channeled the same amount of energy that they expend in deceiving the people into fixing the monetary system, then perhaps they would have already come up with a viable solution by now. To have the slightest fighting chance of resolving this crisis with a solution that benefits the people, politicians and bankers must be courageous enough to tell the public the worst of the truth and to provide for it. But fraud, and perpetuation of an illusion seems to be their only concern today. And with good reason. After all, as illustrated by a recent Center on Budget and Policy Priorities study, they are the only ones benefiting from this fraud. From 2002 to 2007, the top 1% of Americans captured nearly 70% of the income gains in America. Today, in my opinion, today, the number one reason why the vast majority of people still cannot except the possibility that we will soon enter into a second phase of this global economic crisis that will prove to be far worse than the financial disruptions we experienced in 2008 is the following: Most people alive today have no memory of the Great Depression. For those that do, certainly they are able to identify with much greater clarity, the similarities in the patterns of fraud back then and the patterns of fraud occurring today.
By James, on 3 March 10
Some people doodle pictures, but I’m the type who mucks around random bits of historical price data just to see where it goes. For example, I love charts of the Dow Jones Stock index in the 1920s – it me it tells a vivid story of hopes and dreams and pain mixed with desperation. The wild fluctuations in the early 20’s, the solid gains of the mid 20’s then the euphoria and ensuing panic, well.. you know the rest.
A while a go, I came across a quote;
With an ounce of Gold, a man could buy a fine suit of clothes in the time of Shakespeare, in that of Beethoven and Jefferson…
What does a ‘fine suit’ cost today? Well, an ounce of Gold is just short of £700. If you went into Harrods, and asked for a fine suit, would that see you into an Armani or Zegna number? I think so.
So, the maxim seems to ring as true today as it ever did.
So my mind got to thinking – if an ounce of gold seems to buy the same stuff over the centuries as it does today, then it would seem to be a great proxy for true purchasing power.
The problem with looking at historical charts of stock movements, especially if you are trying to learn the lessons of history, is that the picture is muddied by the fact that the unit of account – i.e. money, does not do a very good job. It is rapidly decaying so when you compare over time, it just gives the wrong impression of what is going on.
For example, look at the stock market over the whole of the 70’s, and you think that equities didn’t do too badly. But adjust for inflation, and you soon realize that stocks lost over three quarters of their value in the first half of the 70’s!
So, the idea dawned on me: the price of stocks and shares are only represented in terms of money. What if you priced them in Gold instead of pounds and dollars?
Firstly: what data? Well, I stuck to the UK, and I chose the FTSE all share index. I took the index value for each day, going back a few decades. I then converted them into ounces of gold. The chart gave me a pretty shocking picture.
But then I realised I’d missed something pretty important. Stocks pay dividends. So, I added a 5% annual dividend return, and then reinvested it into my index. Surely that’d make my chart look less ridiculous? Erm, a bit… but not by very much.
What I was left with was a completely different view of history, and some pretty worrying revelations.
Firstly, my chart had nothing to say until the 70’s. This is because until then, money was gold – therefore priced in money or gold – it didn’t make a difference. In essence, the chart had no surprises.
But in the 1970’s, money was cut loose from gold, with some pretty shocking results.
 FTSE All Share in terms of in oz of Gold (click to enlarge) Some salient observations.
1. The mayhem of the early 70’s had some pretty catastrophic consequences for the world, and recovery only came in the 1980’s. From over 12 ounces of gold, down to nearly 1 ounce of gold is a pretty insane move.
2. Real growth took off in the 80’s, but something happened in the mid 90’s – the internet. This was a period of real economic growth, that morphed into a bubble, thanks to some pretty silly policy mistakes by Greenspan et al.
3. What happened in the 00’s? Wasn’t that supposed to be the ‘NICE’ decade? Wasn’t the stock market supposed to have risen back to its peaks?
My answer to this is that the noughties were a period of stagnation, economic misalignment, and we were all swamped by a money fraud.
The authorities were in such a blind funk in 2001, with the overriding perception that we were facing a 1929 style collapse, that they turned on the money gusher, and flooded the whole world with liquidity. This found its way into the greatest worldwide property bubble the world has ever seen.
But… this was not true growth – at least for the Western economies. Sure, great advances were made in some sectors of their economies, but huge misalignments of capital were occurring, and this decade of false signals to producers, but especially to Western consumers, is why we had the economic crisis of 2008.
Look where we stand now. In ruinous debt. Shackled to low interest rates and nervously watching retail sales and property prices. This is a direct consequence of our societies living the high life for ten years, without actually realising we were in decline.
We have been living like cannibals. Hollowing out ourselves out, yet living the high life. And this is all down to a pseudo neo-Keynesian/monetarist aggregate kabala fetish.
I feel a sense of panic looking at this chart, so what is the solution?
Free markets built on the bedrock of honest money.
By Toby Baxendale, on 26 February 10
A bank , building society that uses factional reserves, lends long and pays out short is only going to exist should confidence be kept in it. The “Run on the Rock” in the summer of 2007 saw people queuing to get their cash out of the Northern Rock which resulted in the first systematic run on a bank since the 1866 run on the Overend, Gurney & Company bank in the UK.
Readers of this site will know that a bank can only exist with the legal and accounting privilege that allows them to use current creditors – i.e. the depositors of the Presbyterian Mutual Society (PMS) – to lend out a multiple number of times to property loans and other entrepreneurial loans. Readers will also know that when they deposit money they in effect lend it to the bank and become a creditor to the bank. A deposit of cash into a bank/Mutual means you as the depositee lend money to the bank/Mutual That is, to be very clear, when you deposit, you cease to own the money – the bank does. This was established by law in 1811 in Carr V Carr and reaffirmed in Foley V Hill 1846.
The History
The Society’s audited accounts for the year ended 31st March 2008 showed £305m of loans and £5m of liquid assets to pay up to £310m on demand deposits. So one can deduce that there was only £5m of cash supporting £310m IOUs to its creditors, the depositors. This means that the PMS multiplied its credit creation to the tune of 62 times! This is nearly twice the average of all the banks licensed by the Bank of England. In fairness to the Society, they did pay out £21m before they were left with only £5m of cash, so £26m of cash was in their vaults when the run happened. Thus a more conservative 12 x credit was created out of thin air or a leverage ratio of 1 part cash to 12 parts credit existed in this Society.
A quick refresher on how the banking system allows this creation of credit out of thin air can be found here http://www.cobdencentre.org/2010/02/a-day-of-reckoning/ where I say, “ It is often forgotten but when you place £1m in a savings account (in cash) in say the Royal Bank of Scotland, which has no legal reserve requirement, they then lend £970k (in credit) , keeping on average 3% of cash back in reserves, to an entrepreneur in say HSBC, who then deposits that money in HSBC. We now have one claim to the original £1m and one claim to the £970k. The money supply has moved from £1m to £1.97m – just like magic! This is credit expansion.
The reality is that across all the banks in the United Kingdom licensed by the Bank of England, we have for every £1 of money (in cash), £34 in claims to money (credit)!”
The Administrators’ report tells the sorry story of events in summary which I list underneath, but one glaring fact is omitted. This is that the very Government of the UK actually triggered the loss of confidence in this Bank. When our Prime Minister in his own words was “saving the world” he ordered a full guarantee , government backed, on all deposits. The PMS, which had 10,000 members, went into administration following a rush by savers to withdraw their money at the height of the banking crisis in October 2008. People withdrew their money as they learned the Society was not covered by the government’s bank deposit guarantee scheme. Previously they were content to leave their money in the Society. For the purposes of this article, it is not needed to debate the point: was it or was it not a bank that should have been supported by this guarantee? The salient point being that not being guaranteed scared people into making withdrawals where little existed before.
From the Administrators’ report of the12th January 2009 that can be down loaded here http://www.presbyterianmutualsociety.co.uk/files/Administrator’s%20Proposals%2012.1.09.pdf the Society was placed into Administration by the Directors on 17th November 2008. The following are selected quotes from this report which speak for themselves:
“the demand for withdrawals by members of their investments exceeded its cash reserves;”
“the members’ investments were historically withdrawable on demand but the cash was invested by the Society in longer term investments such as property and loans.”
“For the Society to allow members to withdraw their investments on demand and invest members’ money in longer term investments, the Society required a high degree of confidence among its members that their investments were secure. However this confidence has been severely tested by the current economic climate and eventually the demand by members for withdrawals exceeded the Society’s cash reserves. …I believe it will be difficult for the Society in its current form to continue as a going concern.”
“loan capital will be treated as creditors and will therefore be paid in preference to members’ shares.”
“Government Guarantee
As you will be aware the Society does not benefit from the deposit guarantee scheme.
During the month of October 2008 the Society experienced an unprecedented increase in the number of requests for repayment of members’ investments. It was common practice for the Society to repay investments on receipt of a request, and payments of £21 million were made up to Friday 24th October 2008, leaving £4 million in the Society’s bank account.
An emergency meeting of the Society’s Board of Directors was convened on 25th October 2008 and it was resolved that:
…the 21 day notice period for the repayment of members’ investments be invoked in respect of requests received from members as at that date and any new requests received from members.
On 6th November 2008 the Society’s Board of Directors met again and it was reported that the demand among the Society’s members to withdraw their investments had increased which further exacerbated the Society’s liquidity. It was also reported at this meeting that legal proceedings had been commenced by three members seeking repayment of their investments. It was resolved by the Society’s Board of Directors on 6th November 2008 that the Society should be placed into Administration so that its assets could be protected, subject to enabling legislation being passed to permit the Society to go into administration.
During the period 27th October 2008 to 17th November 2008, the Society had received requests for withdrawals in excess of £50 million but the Society had cash reserves of only £4 million to meet such requests.”
Now this would have been the story of every bank in the UK if the government had not acted as it did as we were ‘panicking’ as a nation. We should also note that all banks are in the same precarious situation as the PMS was with regard to lending long and paying out short still, to this day. Do we need to live like this?
The Future Safe Way to Run Banks and Provide Interest for Savers and Lending to the needs of Trade.
If banks were mandated to hold 100% reserves of cash in their vaults, they could issue their bank statements saying what they owe you each month and you would know that you actually had cash in the vault to support your deposit that is represented by your bank statement. The bank statement after all is only a thing that would more accurately be called a “bank IOU statement.” Should you want interest you could ask for the cash you have deposited to be placed in a highly liquid government bond that could be converted into cash when you need it, paying you a rate of interest. Should you want a higher rate of interest, you can lend your money i.e. cease ownership and place in a bond that has in turn been lent to an entrepreneur for 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 5 years etc with the highest rate of interest being given for the longer term locked away and lent to somebody.
The Solution for Paying Out 100% of the PMS Depositors’ Lost Money- £310m – Now, Today
Following the work of 5 Nobel Prize winners and the founder of the American Chicago School, I would suggest the following written about in the Day of Reckoning article;
The Bank of England immediately issues notes to cover all the deposits i.e. redeem all the depositors for 100% cash notes and coins to be placed in their accounts. Please note, this costs the Bank of England the price of paper and the ink and nothing else and IS NOT INFLATIONARY and generates no liability to the UK taxpayer – see next point.
At the same time, get the administrator of the PMS to delete all current creditors (the depositors) as these have now been redeemed from the bank’s books by the Bank of England. The deleting of these bank obligations means that the money the depositors did lend on deposit to the PSM no longer exists, so for the sake of argument, if there was £310m of deposits, these have been redeemed in cash by the Bank of England and the equivalent amount of deposits have been removed from the money supply. Cost to the Bank of England = zero and cost to the UK tax payer = zero. Money supply stays the same.
The PMS in administration now has only assets i.e. loans from entrepreneurs /people who are repaying the loans or mortgages. These can now continue to get repaid, but instead of paying the creditors of the PMS, there are now none, so these loans can go into paying off the National Debt.
This way all parties win.
A courageous politician in Northern Ireland or in mainland GB could well put forward a Private Members’ bill which could be the first legislative move to establishing Honest Money.
The Day of Reckoning article linked to above provides the start of the legislative solution to the whole UK wide banking system whose model is sadly no different to that of the little PMS.
By Steven Baker, on 23 February 10
James M. Buchanan (Nobel Laureate, economics, 1986) on reform of the monetary regime through constitutional 100% reserves:
The market will not work effectively with monetary anarchy. Politicization is not an effective alternative. We must commence meaningful dialogue with acceptance of these elementary verities. Far too much has been said and written in elaboration of the first statement, which too often is taken to be equivalent to the assertion that “capitalism” or “the market” has failed. Admittedly claims for market efficacy without qualifiers can be found. But economists should know that anarchy can only generate disorder rather than its opposite.
Later:
It follows that there is no economic reason why any money system, in an idealized setting, would allow for leverage at any level. No holder of a unit of money, as an entry in a balance sheet, should be authorized to lend more than the face value of this unit, quite independent of probabilistically determined expectations concerning potential redemptions.
Why not? Because to allow separate banks to create short-term liabilities to a multiple of the base money on the asset side of the account removes from the issuing authority some of the control of the aggregate amount of that value treated as money in the economy without offsetting benefits, thereby making the financial structure vulnerable to unpredictable shifts among instruments, which, in turn, generate changes in real values.
The modern dilemma is that we are left with a massive resource-using, financial- banking structure that has a functional purpose quite different from that which is widely accepted. The system in existence emerged from a historical process, the characteristics of which were partially appropriate for a monetary standard defined in terms of some commodity base, but which, ultimately, make no sense under a fiat system.
Finally:
Let us not waste this set of crises by exclusive recourse to jerry-built efforts to patch up the failed monetary anarchy we have witnessed.
Read more: http://www.mps2009.org/files/Buchanan.pdf
By James, on 22 February 10
I see the panel of economic experts that is the acting industry have latched onto the Tobin tax, now re-branded the ‘Robin Hood Tax’. Never mind that Robin Hood fought against unjust taxes by tyrants: the modern day bogey man is the banker.
Now funny thing is, I do agree with a lot of the sentiment expressed by the morally indignant of Primrose Hill.
Yes, the financial world has grown out of all proportion to the real world
Yes, the rewards for participation in this job seem ludicrously high
Yes, bankers have been bailed out by tax payers and are now furiously spinning the wheels of casino capitalism faster than ever before.
Yes, we should do something about it.
But. Not this.
Firstly, why financial markets are important. The good that these things do is provide a price on the future. They allow us all to insure ourselves against the unknown, whether that be a fixed rate mortgage to buy your house, or a bond issue that allows a company to grow.
Financial markets provide sellers for the shares you want to buy, insurers for risks you want to avoid and lenders when you need to borrow.
Attack the market, and you attack its ability to do this job efficiently. The price will be paid by you.
It is said that the market will absorb the Tobin/Hood/Luvvie tax. Anyone who says this clearly underestimates the ability of a bank to pass on its increased costs. You will either pay directly by higher fees, or indirectly, as the cost of everyday things get more expensive.
And more expensive they will be as the Luvvie tax will infect its way through the whole system. At every stage of production, financial markets are used to quantify and reduce costs. Commodity futures allow manufacturers to fix input costs, freight derivatives allow shippers to control cash flow, forward foreign exchange allows import/export companies to insure against wild market swings, credit insurance allow insurance against default and so on and on.
But surely a tiny transactional tax would pass unnoticed? Well, it may seem tiny, but to many market participants this Luvvie tax will be huge. What people fail to understand is that a regular and competitive price in many instruments come from institutions that are prepared to turn over huge volumes in order to make a net margin often much smaller than the Luvvie tax. In one fell swoop, you make a huge proportion of this trading unprofitable, therefore you take away the ability of the market to provide a price. It’s always the way of ill thought out taxes: unintended consequences. Some arbitrary decision is made, and a myriad of economic activity suddenly becomes futile.
So what? Who needs them? Well, you do. Every time you want to invest in your pension, you will (indirectly) need to buy a bond or some shares. Where do you think the seller comes from? Charity? No, it is the myriad of active traders that act as the buffer between ‘real’ buyers and sellers of these things.
In the end, you will pay by being poorer as a pensioner, by paying more interest on your mortgage and by generally being gouged more by the banks.
And so, we turn to the banks. The true villain of the piece.
The problem with financial markets is that banks are allowed to actively participate in this trading game. It would be less problematic if banks used the markets merely to reduce their risks, but this is not what they do. They see markets as a lucrative opportunity to enhance their profits, and they seize it with both hands.
Why is this bad? Because they punt their customer’s demand deposits. They take the money set aside to pay your gas bill, multiply it up tenfold, then wade onto the casino floor. What allows them to do this with some level of (misplaced) confidence is the myriad of legislative favours, monopoly rights, tax payer protection and political pressure arrayed to support them.
Here at the Cobden Centre, we’ve bleated on time and time again about how fractional reserve banking conjures money out of thin air, but it is worth repeating. You deposit £100 of notes and coin in your current account, and this becomes the property of the bank to do with as they wish. You sign it over to the bank, who lend most of it out. £100 of cash, becomes £197 of purchasing power. Whomever gets £97 loan, deposits it at their bank, and the same happens again and again.
Are you happy that the £100 you think is being safely held aside for your weekly food shopping is being used to fund £1000 of credit default swaps? I thought not.
At the end of the day, what consenting adults do in the privacy of their own bedrooms is of no concern to you. What hedge funds do with their willing clients’ money does not concern anyone but the investor. What pure trading companies do with their retained capital is of no worry to you.
The problem is the banks. An the best way to put a stop to their nefarious influence is not by taxing them and innocent parties. Not by robbing pension funds. Not by forcing you to pay higher fees to manage your financial affairs (as you surely will). No, they way to deal with the problem that banking has become is simple:
Free markets built on the bedrock of honest money.
Further Reading
- Huerta de Soto, Money, Bank Credit and Economic Cycles
- Baxendale, A day of reckoning: how to end the banking crisis now
- What is wrong with banking, part 1: the legal nature of banking contracts
- Frank Whitson Fetter, Development of British Monetary Orthodoxy 1797 – 1875
- F. A. Hayek, Denationalisation of Money: The Argument Refined
- Gordon Kerr, How To Destroy the British Banking System and Bailing out the Banks – Glaring Evidence of Moral Hazard
- James Tyler, My Journey to Austrianism via the City, Money is not working and How to avoid future encounters with financial meltdown
- Irving Fisher, 100% Money, 1935
By Toby Baxendale, on 21 February 10
Via Darius Guppy: our world balances on a sea of debt
What is needed is a root and branch re-evaluation of that most curious of cultural inventions – money, argues Darius Guppy.
See the enclosed article above, it could be written for this site.
I am delighted by the comments that show more and more people are questioning the madness of fractional reserve banking.
Soddy was our first Nobel price winner to suggest 100% reserves as a solution and I am delighted that Guppy is aware of this academic and his work.
By Toby Baxendale, on 16 February 10
The answer is that the US dollar has lost 98.17% of its purchasing power and the pound sterling 99.42% of its purchasing power. Well done then, I suppose, for surpassing even the great tyrants of old who plagued the citizenry of both nations!
Some History
Gold was money for a large part of mankind’s history.
It was discovered by early man to be the most marketable of commodities. As such, the free interaction of people led to this commodity being adopted as the final thing for which all goods and services were traded. This discovery allowed man to lift himself from direct exchange, or barter, of his goods and services to indirect exchange. This indirect exchange allowed the universal application of the division and specialization of labour that has, in turn, given us all the material prosperity we have today. The discovery of money, then, must rank along with language as arguably the most important invention or discovery in the whole course of human history.
Note that, like language, money was not created by the State but by the private and spontaneous interaction of free individuals.
There are many stories in history of wicked monarchs who, to fund their various despotic regimes or lifestyles, would call in the coinage of the realm, extract a small percentage of gold — a “clip” — and then add an impurity before giving them back to the public; this is debasing of the monetary unit. This embezzlement was unlawful for the minter in the private sector and many people over the ages have been executed for stealing from money owners in this way but the monarch usually got away with it. One of the most notable examples in history was when Emperor Nero reduced the value of the denarius from being pure silver weighing 4 grams to 3.8 grams. His financial gain was enormous.
Another great example of history is our very own tyrant per excellence, Henry the VIII. He reduced the weight of sliver in the silver penny to 1/3rd of its purity from 0.925 to 0.250. By the reign of Elizabeth I, the Tudor financier Sir Thomas Gresham had to negotiate a loan from the Antwerp traders to provide more money for her nation. Sir Thomas came back and said
It may please your majesty to understand, that the first occasion of the fall of exchange did grow by the King majesty, your late father, in abasing his coin … which was the occasion that all your fine gold was conveyed out of this your realm.
What became know as Gresham’s law is that “Bad money drives out good under legal tender laws”. In Europe this is know as the Copernicus Law, as he was saying the same thing on the continent. The great medieval philosopher and theologian Nicole d’Oresme was the inspiration of Copernicus on this matter.
Economics of the Matter
A debasement always meant an inflation. Why? As there was more coinage in circulation chasing a similar amount of goods and services for sale, prices rose.
No less a figure than John Maynard Keynes in Economic Consequences of the Peace (1920), said:
By a continuous process of inflation, governments can confiscate, secretly and unobserved, an important part of the wealth of their citizens. By this method, they not only confiscate, but they confiscate arbitrarily; and while the process impoverishes many, it actually enriches some.
This is from a man whose current disciples are inflating the western world’s money supply to a point that can only lead to rampant inflation.
We should remember the names which we have used to label money historically. In the UK “sterling” and in the USA “dollar” each described a fixed weight of gold . Gold was the money unit, not sterling or dollar in itself.
Before World War I the pound sterling was worth $4.86856 and a dollar was worth 1/20th of an ounce of gold. For the sake of simplicity I will say that the pound sterling was defined as ¼ of an ounce of gold and the USA dollar 1/20th of an ounce.
So How Much is my Pound Sterling Worth Today?
The Maths
One ounce of gold today is worth $1,093.40 and 1/20 oz therefore $54.67 but the dollar pre World War I was just a name in the USA for 1/20 of an ounce of gold: what would have cost $1 before World War I would cost $54.67 today. The dollar has lost its purchasing power. In fact it has lost 98.17% of its purchasing power in 100 years. One dollar today should buy something like a single person’s weekly food shop, not a single daily newspaper.
The fate of the pound sterling has been even worse than that of the dollar. One ounce of gold today is £692.26. So if a pound sterling pre World War I was just a name in the UK for 1/4 of an ounce of gold, it would imply that the pre World War I purchasing price was 1/4 of £692.26 or £173.06. In fact the pound sterling has lost 99.42% of its purchasing power in 100 years. One pound should buy something like a good week’s food shop for a familiy of four and not just one daily newspaper like it would today.
Conclusion
Our modern day Neros and Henry VIIIs are those we call our Prime Ministers and our Presidents. We are told they are all well meaning men and women. That may well be the case. They have however, since World War I, sat on the single greatest debasement of our wealth in human history.
They do this via the monetization of their nations’ debt. A politician in power might have promised to give X, Y or Z group of people £X, £Y and £Z in exchange for voting for them. If the tax revenue is not enough, then they simply, out of thin air, either create more money — old style monetizing the debt to pay off the debt obligation — or, with a computer key, they open up a new bank deposit for themselves to pay or buy back some of their debt. This is called “QE” or Quantitive easing and we discuss the errors associated with it here.
Last year the UK raised over £200 billion by one part of the government issuing debt and the other part buying it. So £200 billion of new money is now in circulation. Nero and Henry VIII would blush at the brashness of this debasement. This is done wholly at the expense of yours and my very own purchasing power.
The Cobden Centre exists to promote honest money and social progress. Honest money is money that cannot be debased by governments to pay off liabilities they have incurred over and above their tax revenue. I outlined a banking reform proposal which advocated 100% reserve money here. Staying within the existing paper money regime, one would need a bill to prevent the new issuance of either paper money or computer generated new bank deposits by the government. Ultimately, we must look at fully re rooting our paper money back into solid commodities that the government cannot destroy or create at will.
Further Reading
- Huerta de Soto, Money, Bank Credit and Economic Cycles
- Baxendale, A day of reckoning: how to end the banking crisis now
- What is wrong with banking, part 1: the legal nature of banking contracts
- Frank Whitson Fetter, Development of British Monetary Orthodoxy 1797 – 1875
- F. A. Hayek, Denationalisation of Money: The Argument Refined
- Gordon Kerr, How To Destroy the British Banking System and Bailing out the Banks – Glaring Evidence of Moral Hazard
- James Tyler, My Journey to Austrianism via the City, Money is not working and How to avoid future encounters with financial meltdown
- Irving Fisher, 100% Money, 1935
By Steven Baker, on 15 February 10
 Dowd, Alchemists of Loss We are delighted to announce a forthcoming book by Cobden Centre Senior Fellow Professor Kevin Dowd and US-based journalist and former investment banker Martin Hutchinson: The Alchemists of Loss: How Modern Finance and Government Intervention Crashed the Financial System. The book contains some delightfully simple insights into a complex subject. For example:
The credit default swap sneaked up on everybody, becoming a $62 trillion market, without anyone outside the business knowing much about it. As the Bear Stearns, Lehman and AIG debacles revealed, these instruments also involved highly non-transparent credit risks of their own. As a holder of a CDS you don’t know whether your counterparty has issued only a few of your CDS, in which case you’ll probably get paid in a bankruptcy, or whether he has issued fifty times the outstanding debt you’re trying to hedge, in which case you’re unlikely to get paid.
And moreover:
Financial engineering’s benefit to the global economy is highly questionable and the proliferation of financially-engineered products of recent years has brought few benefits and led to huge losses for society at large. As we have seen, one quarter’s bad losses in late 2008 wiped out all the accumulated financial engineering profits of the last quarter century and saddled taxpayers with a bill for hundreds of billions, if not more.
Prof. Dowd has kindly agreed to pre-release two chapters through The Cobden Centre:
From Chapter 16:
Alert readers will have already picked up some of the advice we would give investors and clients of financial institutions:
- take a longer-term perspective and return to investment rather than speculation;
- do not seek to ‘enhance’ yields, because this always exposes investors to hidden costs and risks, whilst firms seeking finance should resist cutting corners on their financing costs, for the same reason; thus, both parties should be realistic in their expectations;
- avoid frequent trading, focus on static over dynamic strategies, buy and hold over activist portfolio management;
- pay more attention to costs and hidden charges, and work on the assumption that higher charges are usually a good signal of a bad deal;
- distrust commission-based salespeople;
- if you use derivatives, be clear why and use them only for risk management and not speculation;
- avoid complicated opaque products; and
- do not take liquidity for granted and ensure that your liquidity is protected in a crisis.
Besides this motherhood and apple pie stuff, investors should also be careful of correlation-based investment and risk management strategies, which work well when not needed but are apt to break down when they are. This is not to suggest that they should give up on diversification. People understood diversification long before Modern Portfolio Theory, but they tended to practice it differently and more wisely. Diversification was assessed by committees of experienced practitioners, who took a long-term view and relied on their judgment rather than unreliable correlation estimates – a far cry from modern practices of modern fund management, with its obsession with short-term performance assessment
Investors should demand transparency. Perhaps the most sobering lesson we have learned since the subprime crisis broke is the benefit of transparency in business dealings. Time after time, when a fiasco has occurred, a key contributing factors has lack of transparency. Subprime mortgages, CDOs and credit default swaps were all financial innovations that relied crucially on nobody asking too many questions. So too with the vast Madoff Ponzi scheme, involving some of the most sophisticated investors in the world, which rested on the same fatal human omission.
Download Chapter 16 to read on.
From Chapter 17:
The restoration of a rational and stable financial system inevitably requires major reform on a number of fronts. History gives much guidance here and also a role model: the period we should seek to emulate is the nineteenth century. Then money was sound, the dominant currency of the time, the pound, was literally as good as gold, while financial institutions were conservative and generally stable, and an altogether healthier financial ethos reigned.
It is very common these days to sneer at the gold standard: after all, it was Keynes who once dismissed it as “a relic from a barbarous age”. We would suggest, on the contrary, that a gold standard or some suitably 21st Century commodity equivalent would be highly desirable, and put an end to the disastrous century-long experiment with fiat money and its attendant miseries of inflation and monetary instability. The fact that Keynes opposed the gold standard is a further reason to support it.
The nineteenth century model would also entail major reforms to financial institutions and the regulatory system: greater liability and greater responsibility, the repeal of deposit insurance and investor protection legislation and the abolition of the big financial regulatory bodies such as the SEC and FSA. And by nineteenth century standards, we really mean early nineteenth century standards, those that pertained to the period before the Bank Charter Act of 1844 and the Companies Act of 1862, when liability was very real.
As for the banking system, we would suggest that the role model is Scotland pre-1845, when the Scottish banking system was virtually free of state control, unhindered by a central bank, and equally admired and envied across the world – and copied by countries such as Canada and Australia. In all three countries, free banking systems operated highly successful for very long periods of time. Indeed, the Canadian system was widely admired in the United States – and many US reformers in the late nineteenth century saw it as their ideal. The Canadian system was highly stable – apart from the failures of two small Alberta banks in 1985, its last notable bank failure was that of the Home Bank of Canada back in 1923. There were no Canadian bank failures in the 1930s and, even after the establishment of the Bank of Canada in 1934, many still regard the Canadian banking system as the best in the world.
Our first choice environment would be one with a commodity standard, free banking (no central bank) and financial laissez-faire, restrictions on the use of the “limited liability” corporate form and the most limited government. Even if we don’t return all the way to these early nineteenth century standards (and we can imagine the opposition!), we should still move as much as possible in that direction, though we would not advocate the reintroduction of the notorious debtors’ prisons immortalized in the fiction of Charles Dickens! However, our proposed reforms herein are adapted to the “second best world” (if it’s actually that; it may be about thousandth best of all the ‘parallel universe’ possibilities) in which we live, with relatively large government, a fiat currency and a central bank.
The most important institutional policy that must be solved is that of an excessively expansionary monetary policy. Simply making the monetary authority “independent” does not achieve this if the monetary authority retains its interactions with politicians and the financial community, both of which want loose money. The ideal to aim at is a hard money Fed, a Paul Volcker Fed.
Download Chapter 17 to read on.
You can also pre-order Alchemists of Loss at Amazon.
Further Reading
- Huerta de Soto, Money, Bank Credit and Economic Cycles
- Baxendale, A day of reckoning: how to end the banking crisis now
- What is wrong with banking, part 1: the legal nature of banking contracts
- Frank Whitson Fetter, Development of British Monetary Orthodoxy 1797 – 1875
- F. A. Hayek, Denationalisation of Money: The Argument Refined
- Gordon Kerr, How To Destroy the British Banking System and Bailing out the Banks – Glaring Evidence of Moral Hazard
- James Tyler, My Journey to Austrianism via the City, Money is not working and How to avoid future encounters with financial meltdown
- Irving Fisher, 100% Money, 1935
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