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Economics

Iceland and the Western Banking System

Gordon Kerr’s second address this year at the European Parliament was at a meeting of the European Enterprise Institute.  The meeting was chaired by Diego Feio MEP and the meeting organised by Christopher Pichonnier.   The platform was shared with Tryggvi Thor Herbertsson (MP, Iceland) and Rok Spruk, a Lithuania based economist.

1. Introduction

Mr Feio, Mr Pichonnier, ladies and gentlemen, thankyou for inviting me to address you today.  We are here to explain and hopefully start to resolve the Icelandic banking collapse.

By way of brief personal introduction I am a banker.  In my 29 year career I have experienced several banking crises.  In the early 80’s I worked on Paris Club restructurings for Latin American sovereign defaulters.

Later in the 80’s I travelled frequently to the US in connection with the Savings and Loan crisis.  In the early 90’s I worked mainly in Stockholm on mortgage backed transactions during the Swedish banking collapse.

A few years later I designed instruments that would in turn play a small but significant role in precipitating the collapse of the Western banking system.  These instruments were called synthetic capital structures. They  created the appearance of an increase in capital on bank balance sheets when in reality the economic risk and return positions of the banks concerned were essentially the same after the transactions as before.

I am a member of the Advisory Board of a London based banking educational charity – The Cobden Centre, and I work for a small investment banking firm in London.

My message to you today is simple.  There is nothing specific about the way the Icelandic authorities managed its economy or its banking system that caused this massive failure.  The root of the problem lies within the very essence of the banking system itself.  Iceland, as a very small country with an aggressive banking industry, was just at the tipping point when the system itself failed, and has therefore suffered to a disproportionately greater extent than others.

2.  Were the Western Governments correct to bail out the banks?

Imagine the feeling of going to see a doctor with a puzzling medical condition, having both legs amputated, and three months later experiencing a recurrence of the symptoms.  You are admitted to hospital again, but this time the doctor who greets you post examination is far more sombre.

He explains that you have had a pancreatic tumour all along.  Had it been correctly diagnosed on first consultation the tumour would have been annulled, but now it is out of control and certain to kill you.

This, I believe, is a fair parallel with the way in which banks in the UK and many other European countries have been rescued.  I believe the bailouts are having the opposite effect to that which was intended.  They are not helping to re-stimulate lending to small and medium sized businesses – the engines of these economies.

A smarter observer than I has compared the UK solution to the actions of an alcoholic, accepting with equanimity inevitable long term pain as the consequence of his inability to resist the temptation of one more short term, fuzzy high.

There is a danger that solutions presently proposed could accidentally cut the legs off Iceland and condemn its economy to years of stasis, instead of helping to cure its crippled banking condition.

Let us look now at the banking system itself.  The legal rules which allow banks to gamble depositors’ demand funds on long term investments have simply created a liquidity pyramid scheme which, enhanced by various other banking developments, have boosted a variety of assets to unsustainable price levels that cannot be supported by the wealth of the relevant underlying economy.  Iceland, being both part of this system and a tiny country with its own currency, simply sits at the pinnacle of this Western banking system crisis.

3. Iceland and the Global Collapse.

I urge you to resist the temptation of embracing  the political exculpation  of  ‘global credit crunch’.  Although the crisis was truly global this simple linguistic term seeks if anything to discourage serious analysis of what went wrong.

Many papers and speeches I have read  are good quality diarised timelines of events in Iceland, without presenting credible cures or accurate analyses of the cause.

Iceland’s collapse was clearly related to the global failure, but each country does not necessarily need a global solution.  Indeed, whenever I hear of a problem that can only be solved by global accord I cannot avoid the conclusion that such a problem is being expressed as intractable.  The climate change issue is but one other example of a problem looking for a global solution.

Before addressing Iceland’s unique challenges, may I present some of the “banking developments” to which I referred earlier.  I am about to set out just some of the features of permitted banking activity which have combined to create an unsustainable pyramid of asset prices which Western liquidity may struggle to support.

Most of the features I am about to describe do not appear on the radar screen of the press or blissfully ignorant politicians. For brevity I will set out only five such features:

a)     The circular effect whereby asset prices are inflated merely by the creation of loans provided by banks to finance the purchase of such assets.  I have many times witnessed competitive bidding wars between two purchasers wherein the independent valuer has simply up valued the assets each time one side or the other’s bank has issued   a larger loan offer.  It is essentially the case that the size of the loan  determines the asset price, not the other way around.  Therefore it is impossible to divorce the independent valuation of assets from the quantity of debt which banks are willing to issue against the assets.

b)    Under EU fractional reserve regulations banks are required to maintain a minimum of say 8% “fraction” of their exposures as capital.  Since the bulk of European banks are shareholder owned, market forces virtually compel them to push fractional reserve regulation to the limit.  It is very difficult for the CEO of a major bank to keep his job if he is not fully leveraged in supposedly stable market conditions.

c)     The absurd accounting regime that encourages banks to transfer as much exposure as possible into derivative format.  The derivatives accounting regime  presents two important benefits to banks: 1) the front ending of multi year’s hoped for income as Day 1 “profit”, and 2) the ability of a bank to leverage its capital not 12 times (the reciprocal of the 8% basic capital ratio) but up to 200 times (the reciprocal of 1/16 of the basic capital ratio).  The 200 times leverage rule has historically been the starting point for calculating the capital to be reserved against derivative exposures, and now, under  Basel 2 rules, this higher level of leverage is permitted against any AAA rated assets even in non-derivative format provided the bank concerned is regarded as sufficiently sophisticated).

I have a second confession to make.    I was involved in designing the early forms of credit derivatives.  I have written articles about this activity on the Cobden Centre website and I am grateful to its founder, Toby Baxendale, for inviting me to write about this.  Let me clarify for the record one frequently confused point.  The motivation behind the emergence of credit derivatives was not the enabling of banks to distribute loans to non-banks.  That activity was operating perfectly well before the advent of credit derivatives via other financial instruments.

The overriding motive behind the emergence of credit derivatives was in the accounting rules.  Credit derivatives allow banks to book multi-year profits, subject to supposedly conservative reserves, before they have been realised or earned in a sense that would satisfy an accountant in any industry other than banking.

d)    I referred earlier to the liquidity pyramid that results from the legal relationship between banks and depositors.  Depositors’ money belongs in law to the bank, not depositors.  The EU seems aware of this concern and some proposed new regulations talk about inhibiting banks’ future ability to mismatch the maturities of assets and liabilities.  This mismatching has, I believe, been a major contributor to the crisis in a very simple way:

  • Person ‘A’ deposits £100 of cash into his instant-access bank account and receives a promise to return the cash on demand.
  • The bank retains a small reserve (say £3), and lends out £97 to Person ‘B’.
  • Person B purchases £97 worth of goods from person C who in turn redeposits the money in the bank.
  • Both ‘A’ and ‘C’ both have a claim to instant access on this money.
  • In three steps, the bank has turned £100 into £197 of useable money.

e) The use of the ECB discount window to finance banks purchase of assets post crisis.  There has, in the last 10 months, been a gradual rise in the prices of large volumes of the very type of banking assets that many UK commentators have termed “alphabet soup”.  Less kind commentators have termed some of these assets a “Liverpudlian Stew” – a rather unpleasant menu item, even by British culinary standards.  It is  in essence an attempt to present undigestible left over food as attractively as possible. (On behalf of Liverpool may I thank the EU for ordaining it as European City of Culture in 2008).

These price rises seem inconsistent with present reduced liquidity within the banking system. The only explanation I can reach is that some financial institutions have been able to fund their purchases of such assets via the central bank discounting windows such as the ECB itself.  Banks are then, as rational players in a regulated industry, motivated to make money by the monetisation of unrealised future profits by entering into synthetic arrangements on these same assets.  If true this effect will dash all our hopes that we may be coming out of the crisis.

4. ICELAND

Let us look at Iceland more specifically.  The root of the problem lay not in the failure of Iceland’s specific regulators or its national regulation system per se, but in the simple combination of three factors:

  1. i.         Its small size and status as a country;
  2. ii.         Its banks seeking aggressive growth;
  3. iii.         Its acceptance of the Western bank regulatory regime.

The scale of the problem measured against Iceland’s GDP was simply incredible.  The country effectively staked its economic future on international banking, raising capital internationally and lending it out in highly leveraged packages relying on rating agencies and more experienced capital markets arrangers.

The deposit base which lay at the root of the banks’ efforts to prop up the pyramid should have collapsed before the problems became quite so bad, but thanks to Iceland’s status as a sovereign state and international conventions whereby one country’s banks can be “passported” to raise deposits in another, Iceland’s banks succeeded in raising considerable sums of demand deposits from other countries’ savers, in particular the UK and the Netherlands.  Those savers looked only to their own national regulators who, under passporting rules, in capital markets parlance simply “wrapped” the Icelandic Central Bank.’’

Ironically the taxpayers of countries such as the UK and Netherlands in effect wrote credit default protection on Iceland, and now, having been called on this protection, seek to exercise rights of subrogation against the Icelandic taxpaying citizenry.  But if the Icelandic people did not understand what was going on, are these actions not akin to luring the demented old lady next door into leaving you her house in her will and thereby disinheriting her children?

Icelanders who had saved in its major banks, supervised by its national regulators, were effectively performing the function of a junior mezzanine investor (ie just above the shareholders) in the capital structure of a typical “alphabet soup” investment whose fragility was almost impossible for the ordinary taxpayer to understand.

And so, the pyramid inflated further until September 29 2008.  On that date Glitnir, on seeing its credit lines withdrawn following the collapse of Lehman, knew it was unable to raise funds to satisfy a €750 million payment due on October 15th and approached the Central Bank of Iceland for an emergency loan.  The loan request was turned down and instead Glitnir was forced to accept €600m from the central bank in return for a 75% stake.  Its shareholders were practically wiped out[i].

Iceland therefore suffered like no other country, and at a rapacious rate.  At less than 6% of GDP, government debt was tiny at the beginning of 2008.  Under an FRB system that mirrored that of all major European countries its banking system was quickly destroyed and its people burdened with unimaginable levels of debt.

5. What Should Iceland Do?

We have just heard from Dr. Tryggvi Thor Herbertsson MP that there is great doubt as to whether it will join the Euro.  Even if the Eurozone states can fund the PIGS and other bailouts presently planned, should Iceland ask for an EU bailout?

The short term appeal is obvious, is the longer term outlook as rosy?  What of the concerns of abandonment of control over fiscal and monetary policy?  Are these measures consistent with the Icelandic character and way of doing things?

Let us consider Greece very briefly.  The calm 2 weeks  ago when the Greek bailout was announced has been replaced by concern.  The austerity measures the EU would impose will be as unpopular in Iceland as they are in Greece.

There is clearly a gulf between the positions of the bailor and  the bailee.   As I prepare this speech I read in February 25th Daily Telegraph the following report by Ambrose Evans Pritchard:

“Hans-Werner Sinn, head of Germany’s IFO economic institute, said Athens was holding Euroland to ransom, threatening to set off mayhem if there is no bail-out. “Greece should never have entered the euro zone because they did not qualify and they are now blackmailing other European countries via the euro. It’s not for the EU to help Greece. We have an institution that is very experienced in bailing-out activities: the IMF,” he said.

Otmar Issing, former doyen of the European Central Bank, echoed this view in Germany’s Bundestag last Wednesday, warning that a Greek rescue would “open the floodgates” for serial bail-outs and destroy EMU discipline. “The crisis is made in Greece. It is the result of bad policy, not outside forces like an earthquake.” “

Does this rhetoric imply that life under the EU will be much better for Icelanders?  That is clearly a decision for Iceland’s Government and people.

If Iceland joins the EU then I would urge the EU to reform its own regulatory regime fundamentally to protect Iceland from further catastrophe.  Relying on rating agencies as the basis of regulation, rather than markets, makes little sense.

It is not impossible to devise a fractional reserve regulatory system that will work if its practitioners are expert bankers and fully appraised of everything that its banks are engaged in post reform.  But this is fraught with risks.

A far easier solution for Iceland is to make one simple law change.  Grant depositors title to their deposits, stipulate that the state and taxpayers will never again bail out the banks, and allow free market forces to create a safe and transparent banking system.  A ban on the maturity mismatching of assets, combined with a clear policy of NOT bailing out the banks in future, will enable free markets to flourish.

Do not blame the bankers, they were merely acting like rational capitalist players in a wrongly regulated system.  If we are to allocate blame then look to yourselves right here in the Brussels Parliament.  It is you rulemakers who have made the mistakes.  You should have worked this out.

6. Conclusion

The way forward for Iceland should be to look to itself.  Tryggvi, your people have a powerful sense of identity.  You have a wonderful natural economy, a well educated population and a well documented strength of character.  You can fix your problems yourselves, but maybe with a little help from my firm! The detail of implementation needs to be set in the context of modern banking.  A restructured banking system as proposed today would ensure:

1)   Depositors could NEVER AGAIN lose their money;

2)   Credit would resume flowing from savers to entrepreneurs;

3)   The reopening of the international capital markets to Iceland

Without these measures I fear it will be back to the operating theatre in a year or two, with little prospect of a speedy recovery.

Mr Feio, Mr Pichonnier, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your time.

END

Gordon Kerr  – March 2nd 2010

EU Parliament, Brussels


[i] What the Icelandic Collapse has Taught Us, February 2009, Tryggvi Thor Herbertsson

Further Reading

Economics

More evidence of the incompetence of state accountants re derivatives

Via The Telegraph:

Meanwhile Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, criticised investment banks for the role they may have played in helping Greece to mask its fiscal problems: “It would be a disgrace if it turned out to be true that banks that already pushed us to the edge of the abyss were also party to falsifying Greek statistics.” Her comments were in reference to a derivatives deal arranged by Goldman Sachs in 2001 which allowed the Greek government to mask its budget deficit by deferring interest payments.

If questioned on the witness stand, wired to a polygraph, with the death penalty looming for any dishonest response most public officials who had employed “exotic” derivatives structures would admit that the main purpose of the transaction has been to deceive stakeholders in public entities.  It is possible that some decision makers were merely genuinely incompetent, but that is hardly reassuring to taxpayers.  It is worth noting that in every case we discuss on this site the accounting profession provides no defence barrier affording any protection for the taxpayer.  I doubt whether accountants understand derivatives.

When the second phase of this crisis unfolds derivatives will be seen to have been employed for nefarious purposes on a grand and widespread scale.

In the UK I expect the quasi state housing association movement to experience problems when the huge volume of poorly understood debt instruments called “LOBOs” come up for refixing.  The acronym stands for “Lender’s option, Borrrower’s option”.  It is a 20 year loan instrument with early termination options, enabling the bank to play games with the yield curve.  More detail later.

Needless to say any financial product with embedded derivatives purchased by the quasi public sector tends to lead to problems at some stage for the public sector.  If LOBOs were such a good idea why don’t the private sector buy them?

Economics

Boris: The Greeks must be rueing the day they whacked the drachma

BJ’s excellent article today rightly draws comparison between the bailout of Greece and the bailout of Northern Rock.

He makes the excellent point that we should be grateful that the myth of monetary union without federalism is now starkly exposed.

His own shortcoming is that he does not quite understand the seriousness of the banking crisis and therefore his article ends at the crisis point with no solution apparent to the UK’s Greeklike problem, other than the implied debauching of the currency.

Without reform along the simple lines advocated by the Cobden Centre I fear that, even outside the Euro, the banking system may crash again.

Economics

How To Destroy the British Banking System –- Regulatory Arbitrage via ‘Pig on Pork’ Derivatives.

Financial engineer Gordon Kerr explains how to destroy the British banking system through the use of derivatives which take advantage of the regulatory system, then sets out four measures to solve the problem.

Nine years ago I worked as a structuring engineer in a three-man team within the investment banking unit of a major British bank. One of us was very bright. He stunned me one day with an idea as to how we could:

  1. Produce immediate (but illusory) substantial profits for our bank, thus ensuring that we would enjoy generous personal remuneration;
  2. Generate ‘virtual’ share capital to boost our bank’s capital reserves;
  3. Leave the actual investment risk exposure and profit expectation of our bank almost exactly the same after the transaction as before it.

Was this idea the kind of rocket science derivative engineering that justifies master of the universe labels for the three of us who designed and implemented it? No: it was extremely simple. Here’s how it worked. We transmuted some loan assets into a derivative transaction for regulatory purposes, whilst leaving the actual loan arrangements unaltered.

Continue reading “How To Destroy the British Banking System –- Regulatory Arbitrage via ‘Pig on Pork’ Derivatives.”

Economics

Gordon Kerr at the European Parliament

The following is the text of an address by Gordon Kerr, a Cobden Centre Advisory Board Member, to the Brussels Group at the European Parliament on 13th January 2010.

By Invitation of Syed Kamall MEP, Christofer Fjellner MEP and Alexander Graf Lambsdorff MEP. Meeting chaired by Shane Frith.

Syed Kamall, Shane Frith, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for inviting me here to address you today.

1. Introduction

May I provide a few words by way of brief personal background. I have spent the bulk of my 25 year banking career as a structuring engineer.

I played a minor role in wrecking the British banking system by designing and implementing synthetic capital structures – these are mechanisms for banks to produce, as if by magic, additional capital in their accounts which does not in reality exist.

This artificial capital was and remains a product of inconsistent regulatory capital rules that applied to different categories of banking activities.

By way of example: multi billion portfolios of insured loans were flipped from the funded regulatory regime (8% capital ratio) to the derivatives regime (1/16th of this – 0.5%) merely by wrapping them up in credit default swaps.

I will seek to persuade you today of my view that there exists a simple and perhaps Europe-wide cure to the banking crisis. Make a simple legal change.

Simply stipulate that funds deposited under demand deposit contracts with banks belong to the depositor and must be backed by cash or a near cash asset (such as Government bonds).

This proposal would not freeze the banking system. On the contrary, it would revitalise it by ensuring that there could never in future be a run on banks. This proposal would enable free markets to flourish, and would remove the banks from taxpayer dependency.

The European Parliament has this power. Let me invite you to consider using it.

2. Why is this step necessary?

Let me frame the regulatory options very clearly. The number of truly different ways of regulating the banking industry is two. The only alternative to the 100% collateralised demand deposit regulatory structure is the Fractional Reserve system. This is the present system.

Under fractional reserve regulation banks are required to maintain a minimum say 8% “fraction” of their exposures as capital.

Since the bulk of European banks are shareholder owned rather than mutuals or government owned, market forces virtually compel them to push Fractional Reserve regulation to the limit.

No bank CEO could keep his job if he was not fully leveraged in supposedly stable market conditions.

Furthermore, capital is expensive to raise. Under the present system market forces result in the emergence of methods of inflating what I would regard as a fair measure of bank capital such that it appears greater than it actually is.

If the proposal now made is ignored then I fear we will have failed to learn anything from the 2008 collapse.

The alternative is simply to patch the banks back together under a supposedly strengthened Fractional Reserving set of regulations. However, FR in any form is almost certain to lead to another boom bust cycle.

In the initial phase banks will generate large profits as they again inflate the money supply, driving asset prices up which in circular fashion will boost lending once again as the collateral values of the assets justify greater and greater loans. This will give the appearance of economic growth but, like the boom that preceded the present bust, it will merely be storing up more problems for present and future taxpayers.

Contrast the sincere and genuine concern shown here in this Parliament for the interests of future generations in the context of our climate change concerns with the scant regard for their financial interests demonstrated by our continued tolerance of ineffective banking regulation.

3. A few words on the critical importance of demand deposit contracts.

Why has the UK Government, and others, bailed out banks? Of all the stakeholders in banks, which category of stakeholder was deemed so important that such previously unimagined sums needed to be spent to protect its interests?

Borrowers’ interests did not justify the bailout; their loans would be treated as an asset in liquidation and sold to the highest bidder;

Shareholders – surely this is the class of stakeholder least deserving of any taxpayer rescue funds.

Lenders – mainly other banks and institutions. This class does not merit state protection, they knew the risks and took them. Likewise derivative counterparties; this class is in exactly the same category as lenders, the only difference being the technical point that most derivative exposures are unfunded as opposed to funded. The widely quoted credit default swap market illustrates the maturity and professionalism with which both these categories of stakeholder assume credit exposure to banks.

The key stakeholder whose interests could not be sacrificed must be DEPOSITORS. Why are depositors’ interests considered so important and deserving? I think the answer to this question must be that depositors mistakenly believed back in October 2008, and even since then, that funds they deposit in a bank belong to them. That is a serious mistake. In case any of you are in any doubt there is no legal difference in any European jurisdiction of which I am aware between a deposit contract and a loan contract. Both are loans to the bank and a deposit contract is a loan that can be called back by the lender supposedly on demand.

But few UK citizens are aware of this point. A recent UK survey found that 70% of the sample surveyed believe that depositors own the money they put in a bank, just as the client of a law firm owns the funds he leaves in a solicitor’s Client account in the UK. How would you feel if you went to collect your funds from your solicitor and were told “ I’m sorry, I’ve just lost all your money by speculating it without your permission in an attempt to boost my profits? ” Yet this is how we approve of banks treating our demand deposits under fractional-reserve banking rules.

The proposal now submitted would prevent future crashes and would recognize the critical importance of demand depositors by stipulating that ownership of demand deposit funds remained with the depositors, not the banks.

Market forces would ensure that banks worthy of surviving the present crisis would clean up their business models and render their balance sheets transparent. They would seek to grow and profit by persuading depositors to convert some deposits to loans.

4. Replies to Possible Objections

Various objections have been set out:

- Banks would fail to be able to provide loans. Response: Bank lending would only be curtailed to the extent that they could not provide loans not backed by savings willingly lent to banks. Some of the projects presently being financed would not succeed in obtaining credit in such an environment. This is surely no bad thing since it is precisely these marginally viable transactions that form the tipping point of each successive banking crisis. Only 3% of the UK Bank’s liabilities are demand deposits.

- Interest rates would rise and economic development be held back. Response: The absence of bank crises would eliminate the massive squandering of capital goods which accompanies severe recessions, and there is no reason to suppose that the interest rate would be any higher in such a system than the market rate implied in today’s environment. Again, the matching up of saved funds with loaned funds should prevent the inception of non- viable projects saving the system from the crashes which always lead to a freezing up of bank lending.

- A 100% reserve requirement would inhibit the contractual freedom of the parties. Response: On the contrary, the proposal represents the natural application of traditional property law principles to a monetary deposit contract.

- Economic growth is not possible without a certain amount of credit expansion and inflation. Response: May I quote De Soto “ The slight, gradual and continuous deflation (in the sense of a rise in the purchasing power of the monetary unit) would actively foster sustained, harmonious economic development”.

5. Conclusion

At the point of collapse the Royal Bank of Scotland had leveraged itself so severely that it had lent out each pound sterling sitting in so called demand deposit accounts 66 times.

Even the most prominent defenders of fractional-reserve banking recognize that the establishment of a 100% reserve requirement would put an end to banking crises.

Simon Johnson, former Chief Economist of the IMF said in May 09 “The Finance industry has effectively captured our Government…recovery will fail unless we break this financial oligarchy”

You have the power to prevent any recurrence of these banking crises and to free governments and taxpayers from the finance industry. I urge you to use it, change the legal status of demand deposit contracts as proposed – provide that such funds remain 100% cash backed and remain the property of depositors.

Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you.

Gordon Kerr
January 13th 2010

Further reading

Economics

Imagine that the Crisis was a Shortage of Bread

One day in October 2008, the UK’s banks all collapsed.

Perhaps it would be more accurate to date stamp the collapse one year earlier when Northern Rock failed and was rescued.  UK Banking, in a commercial sense, ended on that date.  We now have a state sponsored banking system.  Some would disagree because banks such as Barclays have not actually grabbed the lifeboat, but I beg to differ.  If the Government removed support from the banks it has underwritten then Barclays too would fail, so the entire UK system is effectively nationalised.

Most politicians and media commentators appear to have accepted the state bailout as a reasonable response to the banking collapse.  We are asked to believe that the lifeblood of the economy, bank lending, is flowing again.  However, data supporting this contention is hard to find.  That which does exist is artificially enhanced by the Government’s injection of artificial, printed money.

The media soothe us with frequent assertions that the bailout and its sister policy, QE,  are working, but they are clutching at straws.  The banking bailout combined with the printing of money taken together is the single worst economic decision ever made by any UK Government.  Let me prove this  by way of simple analogy.

Just for one moment let us imagine that October 2007 did not portend the banking crisis that would shortly unfold, but a different and even worse catastrophe.  Let us pretend that we woke up that autumnal morning to discover that there would be no more food.

We all listened in silence as our tearful Prime Minister announced that Al Qaeda had won.  All of the world’s soil had just been contaminated with a terrible and genocidal bug.  There was no antidote to, nor means of arresting the spread of, this terrible bug.  There was no hope of killing it.

We could no longer eat anything grown in the ground. Nor could we ever consume farm animals, because they of course graze on land.  An emergency measure dictated that we put our pets to death to conserve precious food supplies.  We could eat them now, but this would only delay the inevitable starvation for a few days.

We were all certain to die if we ate any food harvested from October 2007.  All our international trading partners had been similarly infected.  No other country would send us any food, they all had the same problem.  A raft of worldwide emergency measures would ensure that no food would be imported to the UK.

Happily there was one exception, one strain of produce that was immune to the bug -  wheat.  There was one food we could still eat, bread.

Ironically the bread baking industry was going through its own mini crisis as this news broke.  The bakers were all on the verge of bankruptcy because, a month earlier, the UK’s dominant retailing business, Tescopoly, had decided to sell bread at 1p per loaf in order to rid the nation’s high streets of the few remaining shops that were preventing its continued expansion.

The Government had not worried about the strangulation of the high street baker when Tescopoly had launched that attack, but the new food crisis brought an immediate change of policy.   Every baker in the UK was to be bailed out by the taxpayer.  The practical measures were in three parts.  The Government would immediately and indefinitely:

  1. Service the rents and business debts of every bakery in the UK;
  2. Pay senior bakery staff their base salaries plus substantial bonuses in return merely for agreeing to keep their bakeries open and turning up for work;
  3. Fix the price of all bread to be produced.  Prior to the Tescopoly assault bakers were selling standard loaves at an average price of £2.  Even at that price they only made a 10% profit, or 20p per loaf.  The deadly bug was hardly likely to lower the costs of wheat, and yet the Government decided to fix the price of a standard loaf at 40p, a reduction of 80%.  [Sharp readers will note that by October 2008 UK interest rates had been fixed at 1%, an 80% reduction from the pre-crash level of 5%].

The Government anticipated difficulties in selling this policy to the public.  It easily persuaded the bakers (in return for the free money they would enjoy) to issue statements to the effect that they would make “every effort” to bake as much bread and feed the starving population.  However these palliative words were accompanied by the stark warning that, of course, the Government could not actually run the bakeries nor guarantee levels of bread production.

How much bread do you think the bakers produced after this bailout?

As soon as the disappointing news about continued bread shortages broke, the Government announced that it was surprised that the rate of increase of bread production was disappointing.  Swathes of the population were starving to death.  The Government spin machine turned on the bakers who were castigated as socially irresponsible.  The press reported a new era of zombie bakers, and the nation’s patience was further tested when it was reported that many bakers were stockpiling wheat, not even turning their ovens on in the mornings, yet ordering lots of new Ferraris.

Desperate to defend itself the Government dreamed up another wheeze designed to confuse the public and mask the problem: falsifying the wheat accounts.  Because the original emergency measures had provided that the Government was now the sole auditor of the wheat supply, the Chancellor of the Wheat Exchequer decided simply to pretend that we had twice as much of it.

Eminent economists and nutritional experts were wheeled out to explain that “cooking the books” made sense.  The public were brazenly told that the exercise was simple false accounting, but they did not object, so desperate were they for any hope of increased bread production.

To maintain the pretence, the virtual wheat was treated as if it were real.  It was manufactured on a computer overnight by the Chancellor and was kept in a virtual cold store.  The policy was given a fancy name – “Quantitative Freezing”.

Incredibly this policy boosted morale for a year or so and was presented as working.  The Government basked in the glory of saving the nation from starvation.  However the burial grounds were filling rapidly and the emperor’s true nakedness was exposed when the crematoria sought permission from the Department for Climate Change to burn bodies 24/7.

Economics

The 5 percent banking system bailout – The reciprocal of derivatives calculus

Those unfamiliar with the fine detail of derivatives pricing, regulatory capital, and accounting may have been surprised by Warren Buffet’s 2002 observation that derivatives are “the financial weapons of mass destruction”.

Further evidence of the great sage’s wisdom emerges in the Dec 8th edition of The Times. Neel Kashkari, the 35 year old banker picked by US Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson to “design” the US bailout called TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Plan) admits how the figure $700 billion was arrived at:

We have $11 trillion residential mortgages, $3 trillion commercial mortgages. Total $14 trillion. Five per cent of that is $700 billion. A nice round number.

This detail is revealing. 5% is the flip side of 95%. What is the significance of this? 95% is the magic number which has driven the enormous growth of the unfunded derivatives market. The term ‘unfunded’ is important, since the regulators had always felt comfortable in designing rules for funded assets (commonly known as loans). That task was deemed relatively easy and banks have been required to allocate 8% of capital reserves to back up their loan books.

However, unfunded exposures under swaps, forwards, options and so forth collectively known as “derivative” transactions were more difficult to analyse and control. As a result, the derivatives industry had boomed since its inception in the early 1980’s primarily on the back of remarkably generous regulatory and accounting treatment. The starting point for regulatory capital is 0.5% of “exposure”, or 1/16th of the base requirement for funded assets. For long term transactions this 0.5% figure may be augmented by the addition of reserved profit.

I must admit that this expression – reserving the profit – always struck me as the wrong way around. How would the government’s regulator of water companies react if the water industry sought to prepare new balance sheets showing today’s capital base substantially increased by the reservation of future years’ profits, then reduced back to a still inflated figure by the deduction of a portion of this reserve “for conservatism”?

Encouraged by the banks’ own pricing experts, the regulators have accepted the use of historical data analysis as the basis of the rules they established to measure the capital requirement for any risk position on a bank’s derivative book.

The mapping of these historic data observations on bell shaped normal distribution charts is at the root of accounting and regulatory capital rules for derivatives, none of which have been changed as a result of the collapse of the banking system. These charts drive pricing models and internal risk controls. Bank traders use the models to place a value on each such exposure, generally ignoring outcomes that would be outside two standard deviations from the historical norm. ‘Two standard deviations’ simply expressed, covers 95% of the outcomes.

Although regulators require investment grade banks to capitalise for risk measured beyond the 95th percentile, the 95% test is applied extensively as a ‘practical’ benchmark. If a deal ‘works’ at 95% it is generally done. If it continues to satisfy this test year after year, relevant time based portions of the profit ‘reserved’ (ie not taken into profit and loss account at inception) will be recognised.

This use of these charts always struck me as questionable on two counts:

a) Excessive reliance on historical outcomes as a predictor of the future;
b) The confirmation bias present in the mapping of the data.

Traders and transaction specialists both outnumber and are paid far more than their internal and external regulators. The internal regulators control profits and bonuses. Put simply, if the pricing or capital cost outcome of the model inputs does not fit the price on offer for the trade, the data can be re-analysed and mapped again more conveniently. This point is of particular note in ‘exotic’ derivatives territory; transactions whose subject matter is less commonly priced in the money, bond, or commodity markets. Examples such as weather, human mortality, or corporate credit defaults come to mind.

Even senior bankers unfamiliar with minutiae of derivatives calculations are aware of the significance of the 95% benchmark. So here we see the intuitive appeal of Kashkari’s sizing of the US TARP bailout – he filled the 5% confidence gap.

Economics

Derivatives and Regulatory Failure – Precipice Bonds

Financial engineer Gordon Kerr presents the prequel to his article How to destroy the British Banking System – Regulatory Arbitrage via “Pig on Pork” Derivatives.

The 1997 Labour victory promised major changes to regulation and supervision of banks and the financial services industry. Shortly after Labour came to power I was working as a structuring engineer on the derivatives/securitisation desk at a big brand UK bank; I was aware of a few of the tricks of the trade, and I looked forward to rules being published that would no doubt tighten things up.

It soon became clear that the scope of the Financial Services Authority’s supervisory remit would grow. Regulators were gaining airtime and political clout, particularly in the aftermath of the 1998 collapse of Long Term Capital Management, a large US hedge fund set up by famous traders and derivatives specialists.

By early 1999 I began to realise that the actual regulatory function of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) was indeed changing; it was weakening markedly.

Relationships between bank staff and regulators were becoming friendlier, more personal. Actual supervision appeared to be widening but was in fact becoming less substantial. Greater weight appeared to be being placed on the bank’s “internal” regulatory function and I suspect that the FSA officers looked up to many of my internal colleagues. Why? Because I sensed the officers were just a little out of their depth. They needed help from the team of bank staff tasked with presenting our new structures to the regulators for approval.

Our internal teams that dealt with the regulators began to grow in confidence.
Continue reading “Derivatives and Regulatory Failure – Precipice Bonds”

Economics

Now State takes over bankers’ contracts – Telegraph

Via Now State takes over bankers’ contracts – Telegraph:

The new rules, which critics are likely to suggest amount to a State-enforced “incomes policy” for banks, will be contained in the Financial Services Bill to be announced in the Queen’s Speech.

The bill will give the Financial Services Authority (FSA) the power to cancel bankers’ contracts to prevent them receiving payments that it believes would cause instability in the financial system.

The FSA could stop bankers receiving bonuses that it believes are too high, or cancel remuneration packages that it thinks reward undue risk-taking.

It is hard to see this proposal as anything other than political posturing given the forthcoming election.  Are we to establish a new quango/ regulator “Ofpay”?  What will be the cost of that?  What access will individual bankers be allowed to their assessors?  How can the state decide which bankers have performed socially-useful functions and made positive contributions to the long term good of the bank concerned?  Working in a structured finance role in a dealing room environment is like being an MEP in the EU.  You have to be part of a team.  Management will only negotiate with voting blocs! One member of the team has to play the internal politics as in many other businesses, but this is of course an unproductive waste of time as far as shareholders are concerned.    How much more unproductive time will be spent trotting off to Ofpay to explain your achievements?

The root of the problem is the unreliable nature of banks’ reported profits. If the p&l was a sound number, surely the state could rely on employers to reward?  This news affirms my fear that the Government knows that the front-ending of prospective profits from derivatives trades and treating them as today’s “profit”, along with similar bank specific accounting wheezes, produce unreliable reported accounts.  That is the mischief the legislators should be focussing on.

Get that right and wages will look after themselves.

Further Reading

Economics

The Government’s asset fire sale

Gordon Kerr explains the futility of the Government’s planned asset fire sale.

The Government plans “a fire sale of assets worth £16 billion” to raise funds for our national coffers. All of the assets mooted -– the Tote, the Dartford Crossing, the Channel Tunnel rail link –- generate cash. In normal market conditions, they would be highly valued by the private sector. But these are not normal market conditions and, even if they were, the sale would be absurd.

Since these assets all generate cash, there is no net gain to the public purse from selling them. When their cash yield is greater than the interest cost of Government debt, the public purse is better off holding them than selling them to pay off debt.

More importantly, the sales are likely to be only partial. Recent experience has shown that the Government cannot bring itself to allow major infrastructure companies to fail. If Dartford Crossing plc teetered on the brink of collapse, the government would almost certainly support it but that which the private sector produces better than the public sector should be in wholly private hands, free of all taxpayer-backed guarantees.

Lenders to these “privatised” businesses would benefit from at least an implicit government guarantee. The government will be selling the upside of investing in the assets to the private sector whilst underwriting the bulk of the risk.

This amounts to selling assets to oneself, while giving away free money.