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By Toby Baxendale, on 26 February 10
A bank , building society that uses factional reserves, lends long and pays out short is only going to exist should confidence be kept in it. The “Run on the Rock” in the summer of 2007 saw people queuing to get their cash out of the Northern Rock which resulted in the first systematic run on a bank since the 1866 run on the Overend, Gurney & Company bank in the UK.
Readers of this site will know that a bank can only exist with the legal and accounting privilege that allows them to use current creditors – i.e. the depositors of the Presbyterian Mutual Society (PMS) – to lend out a multiple number of times to property loans and other entrepreneurial loans. Readers will also know that when they deposit money they in effect lend it to the bank and become a creditor to the bank. A deposit of cash into a bank/Mutual means you as the depositee lend money to the bank/Mutual That is, to be very clear, when you deposit, you cease to own the money – the bank does. This was established by law in 1811 in Carr V Carr and reaffirmed in Foley V Hill 1846.
The History
The Society’s audited accounts for the year ended 31st March 2008 showed £305m of loans and £5m of liquid assets to pay up to £310m on demand deposits. So one can deduce that there was only £5m of cash supporting £310m IOUs to its creditors, the depositors. This means that the PMS multiplied its credit creation to the tune of 62 times! This is nearly twice the average of all the banks licensed by the Bank of England. In fairness to the Society, they did pay out £21m before they were left with only £5m of cash, so £26m of cash was in their vaults when the run happened. Thus a more conservative 12 x credit was created out of thin air or a leverage ratio of 1 part cash to 12 parts credit existed in this Society.
A quick refresher on how the banking system allows this creation of credit out of thin air can be found here http://www.cobdencentre.org/2010/02/a-day-of-reckoning/ where I say, “ It is often forgotten but when you place £1m in a savings account (in cash) in say the Royal Bank of Scotland, which has no legal reserve requirement, they then lend £970k (in credit) , keeping on average 3% of cash back in reserves, to an entrepreneur in say HSBC, who then deposits that money in HSBC. We now have one claim to the original £1m and one claim to the £970k. The money supply has moved from £1m to £1.97m – just like magic! This is credit expansion.
The reality is that across all the banks in the United Kingdom licensed by the Bank of England, we have for every £1 of money (in cash), £34 in claims to money (credit)!”
The Administrators’ report tells the sorry story of events in summary which I list underneath, but one glaring fact is omitted. This is that the very Government of the UK actually triggered the loss of confidence in this Bank. When our Prime Minister in his own words was “saving the world” he ordered a full guarantee , government backed, on all deposits. The PMS, which had 10,000 members, went into administration following a rush by savers to withdraw their money at the height of the banking crisis in October 2008. People withdrew their money as they learned the Society was not covered by the government’s bank deposit guarantee scheme. Previously they were content to leave their money in the Society. For the purposes of this article, it is not needed to debate the point: was it or was it not a bank that should have been supported by this guarantee? The salient point being that not being guaranteed scared people into making withdrawals where little existed before.
From the Administrators’ report of the12th January 2009 that can be down loaded here http://www.presbyterianmutualsociety.co.uk/files/Administrator’s%20Proposals%2012.1.09.pdf the Society was placed into Administration by the Directors on 17th November 2008. The following are selected quotes from this report which speak for themselves:
“the demand for withdrawals by members of their investments exceeded its cash reserves;”
“the members’ investments were historically withdrawable on demand but the cash was invested by the Society in longer term investments such as property and loans.”
“For the Society to allow members to withdraw their investments on demand and invest members’ money in longer term investments, the Society required a high degree of confidence among its members that their investments were secure. However this confidence has been severely tested by the current economic climate and eventually the demand by members for withdrawals exceeded the Society’s cash reserves. …I believe it will be difficult for the Society in its current form to continue as a going concern.”
“loan capital will be treated as creditors and will therefore be paid in preference to members’ shares.”
“Government Guarantee
As you will be aware the Society does not benefit from the deposit guarantee scheme.
During the month of October 2008 the Society experienced an unprecedented increase in the number of requests for repayment of members’ investments. It was common practice for the Society to repay investments on receipt of a request, and payments of £21 million were made up to Friday 24th October 2008, leaving £4 million in the Society’s bank account.
An emergency meeting of the Society’s Board of Directors was convened on 25th October 2008 and it was resolved that:
…the 21 day notice period for the repayment of members’ investments be invoked in respect of requests received from members as at that date and any new requests received from members.
On 6th November 2008 the Society’s Board of Directors met again and it was reported that the demand among the Society’s members to withdraw their investments had increased which further exacerbated the Society’s liquidity. It was also reported at this meeting that legal proceedings had been commenced by three members seeking repayment of their investments. It was resolved by the Society’s Board of Directors on 6th November 2008 that the Society should be placed into Administration so that its assets could be protected, subject to enabling legislation being passed to permit the Society to go into administration.
During the period 27th October 2008 to 17th November 2008, the Society had received requests for withdrawals in excess of £50 million but the Society had cash reserves of only £4 million to meet such requests.”
Now this would have been the story of every bank in the UK if the government had not acted as it did as we were ‘panicking’ as a nation. We should also note that all banks are in the same precarious situation as the PMS was with regard to lending long and paying out short still, to this day. Do we need to live like this?
The Future Safe Way to Run Banks and Provide Interest for Savers and Lending to the needs of Trade.
If banks were mandated to hold 100% reserves of cash in their vaults, they could issue their bank statements saying what they owe you each month and you would know that you actually had cash in the vault to support your deposit that is represented by your bank statement. The bank statement after all is only a thing that would more accurately be called a “bank IOU statement.” Should you want interest you could ask for the cash you have deposited to be placed in a highly liquid government bond that could be converted into cash when you need it, paying you a rate of interest. Should you want a higher rate of interest, you can lend your money i.e. cease ownership and place in a bond that has in turn been lent to an entrepreneur for 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 5 years etc with the highest rate of interest being given for the longer term locked away and lent to somebody.
The Solution for Paying Out 100% of the PMS Depositors’ Lost Money- £310m – Now, Today
Following the work of 5 Nobel Prize winners and the founder of the American Chicago School, I would suggest the following written about in the Day of Reckoning article;
The Bank of England immediately issues notes to cover all the deposits i.e. redeem all the depositors for 100% cash notes and coins to be placed in their accounts. Please note, this costs the Bank of England the price of paper and the ink and nothing else and IS NOT INFLATIONARY and generates no liability to the UK taxpayer – see next point.
At the same time, get the administrator of the PMS to delete all current creditors (the depositors) as these have now been redeemed from the bank’s books by the Bank of England. The deleting of these bank obligations means that the money the depositors did lend on deposit to the PSM no longer exists, so for the sake of argument, if there was £310m of deposits, these have been redeemed in cash by the Bank of England and the equivalent amount of deposits have been removed from the money supply. Cost to the Bank of England = zero and cost to the UK tax payer = zero. Money supply stays the same.
The PMS in administration now has only assets i.e. loans from entrepreneurs /people who are repaying the loans or mortgages. These can now continue to get repaid, but instead of paying the creditors of the PMS, there are now none, so these loans can go into paying off the National Debt.
This way all parties win.
A courageous politician in Northern Ireland or in mainland GB could well put forward a Private Members’ bill which could be the first legislative move to establishing Honest Money.
The Day of Reckoning article linked to above provides the start of the legislative solution to the whole UK wide banking system whose model is sadly no different to that of the little PMS.
By Steven Baker, on 23 February 10
James M. Buchanan (Nobel Laureate, economics, 1986) on reform of the monetary regime through constitutional 100% reserves:
The market will not work effectively with monetary anarchy. Politicization is not an effective alternative. We must commence meaningful dialogue with acceptance of these elementary verities. Far too much has been said and written in elaboration of the first statement, which too often is taken to be equivalent to the assertion that “capitalism” or “the market” has failed. Admittedly claims for market efficacy without qualifiers can be found. But economists should know that anarchy can only generate disorder rather than its opposite.
Later:
It follows that there is no economic reason why any money system, in an idealized setting, would allow for leverage at any level. No holder of a unit of money, as an entry in a balance sheet, should be authorized to lend more than the face value of this unit, quite independent of probabilistically determined expectations concerning potential redemptions.
Why not? Because to allow separate banks to create short-term liabilities to a multiple of the base money on the asset side of the account removes from the issuing authority some of the control of the aggregate amount of that value treated as money in the economy without offsetting benefits, thereby making the financial structure vulnerable to unpredictable shifts among instruments, which, in turn, generate changes in real values.
The modern dilemma is that we are left with a massive resource-using, financial- banking structure that has a functional purpose quite different from that which is widely accepted. The system in existence emerged from a historical process, the characteristics of which were partially appropriate for a monetary standard defined in terms of some commodity base, but which, ultimately, make no sense under a fiat system.
Finally:
Let us not waste this set of crises by exclusive recourse to jerry-built efforts to patch up the failed monetary anarchy we have witnessed.
Read more: http://www.mps2009.org/files/Buchanan.pdf
By Toby Baxendale, on 21 February 10
Via Darius Guppy: our world balances on a sea of debt
What is needed is a root and branch re-evaluation of that most curious of cultural inventions – money, argues Darius Guppy.
See the enclosed article above, it could be written for this site.
I am delighted by the comments that show more and more people are questioning the madness of fractional reserve banking.
Soddy was our first Nobel price winner to suggest 100% reserves as a solution and I am delighted that Guppy is aware of this academic and his work.
By Toby Baxendale, on 16 February 10
The answer is that the US dollar has lost 98.17% of its purchasing power and the pound sterling 99.42% of its purchasing power. Well done then, I suppose, for surpassing even the great tyrants of old who plagued the citizenry of both nations!
Some History
Gold was money for a large part of mankind’s history.
It was discovered by early man to be the most marketable of commodities. As such, the free interaction of people led to this commodity being adopted as the final thing for which all goods and services were traded. This discovery allowed man to lift himself from direct exchange, or barter, of his goods and services to indirect exchange. This indirect exchange allowed the universal application of the division and specialization of labour that has, in turn, given us all the material prosperity we have today. The discovery of money, then, must rank along with language as arguably the most important invention or discovery in the whole course of human history.
Note that, like language, money was not created by the State but by the private and spontaneous interaction of free individuals.
There are many stories in history of wicked monarchs who, to fund their various despotic regimes or lifestyles, would call in the coinage of the realm, extract a small percentage of gold — a “clip” — and then add an impurity before giving them back to the public; this is debasing of the monetary unit. This embezzlement was unlawful for the minter in the private sector and many people over the ages have been executed for stealing from money owners in this way but the monarch usually got away with it. One of the most notable examples in history was when Emperor Nero reduced the value of the denarius from being pure silver weighing 4 grams to 3.8 grams. His financial gain was enormous.
Another great example of history is our very own tyrant per excellence, Henry the VIII. He reduced the weight of sliver in the silver penny to 1/3rd of its purity from 0.925 to 0.250. By the reign of Elizabeth I, the Tudor financier Sir Thomas Gresham had to negotiate a loan from the Antwerp traders to provide more money for her nation. Sir Thomas came back and said
It may please your majesty to understand, that the first occasion of the fall of exchange did grow by the King majesty, your late father, in abasing his coin … which was the occasion that all your fine gold was conveyed out of this your realm.
What became know as Gresham’s law is that “Bad money drives out good under legal tender laws”. In Europe this is know as the Copernicus Law, as he was saying the same thing on the continent. The great medieval philosopher and theologian Nicole d’Oresme was the inspiration of Copernicus on this matter.
Economics of the Matter
A debasement always meant an inflation. Why? As there was more coinage in circulation chasing a similar amount of goods and services for sale, prices rose.
No less a figure than John Maynard Keynes in Economic Consequences of the Peace (1920), said:
By a continuous process of inflation, governments can confiscate, secretly and unobserved, an important part of the wealth of their citizens. By this method, they not only confiscate, but they confiscate arbitrarily; and while the process impoverishes many, it actually enriches some.
This is from a man whose current disciples are inflating the western world’s money supply to a point that can only lead to rampant inflation.
We should remember the names which we have used to label money historically. In the UK “sterling” and in the USA “dollar” each described a fixed weight of gold . Gold was the money unit, not sterling or dollar in itself.
Before World War I the pound sterling was worth $4.86856 and a dollar was worth 1/20th of an ounce of gold. For the sake of simplicity I will say that the pound sterling was defined as ¼ of an ounce of gold and the USA dollar 1/20th of an ounce.
So How Much is my Pound Sterling Worth Today?
The Maths
One ounce of gold today is worth $1,093.40 and 1/20 oz therefore $54.67 but the dollar pre World War I was just a name in the USA for 1/20 of an ounce of gold: what would have cost $1 before World War I would cost $54.67 today. The dollar has lost its purchasing power. In fact it has lost 98.17% of its purchasing power in 100 years. One dollar today should buy something like a single person’s weekly food shop, not a single daily newspaper.
The fate of the pound sterling has been even worse than that of the dollar. One ounce of gold today is £692.26. So if a pound sterling pre World War I was just a name in the UK for 1/4 of an ounce of gold, it would imply that the pre World War I purchasing price was 1/4 of £692.26 or £173.06. In fact the pound sterling has lost 99.42% of its purchasing power in 100 years. One pound should buy something like a good week’s food shop for a familiy of four and not just one daily newspaper like it would today.
Conclusion
Our modern day Neros and Henry VIIIs are those we call our Prime Ministers and our Presidents. We are told they are all well meaning men and women. That may well be the case. They have however, since World War I, sat on the single greatest debasement of our wealth in human history.
They do this via the monetization of their nations’ debt. A politician in power might have promised to give X, Y or Z group of people £X, £Y and £Z in exchange for voting for them. If the tax revenue is not enough, then they simply, out of thin air, either create more money — old style monetizing the debt to pay off the debt obligation — or, with a computer key, they open up a new bank deposit for themselves to pay or buy back some of their debt. This is called “QE” or Quantitive easing and we discuss the errors associated with it here.
Last year the UK raised over £200 billion by one part of the government issuing debt and the other part buying it. So £200 billion of new money is now in circulation. Nero and Henry VIII would blush at the brashness of this debasement. This is done wholly at the expense of yours and my very own purchasing power.
The Cobden Centre exists to promote honest money and social progress. Honest money is money that cannot be debased by governments to pay off liabilities they have incurred over and above their tax revenue. I outlined a banking reform proposal which advocated 100% reserve money here. Staying within the existing paper money regime, one would need a bill to prevent the new issuance of either paper money or computer generated new bank deposits by the government. Ultimately, we must look at fully re rooting our paper money back into solid commodities that the government cannot destroy or create at will.
Further Reading

- Huerta de Soto, Money, Bank Credit and Economic Cycles
- Baxendale, A day of reckoning: how to end the banking crisis now
- What is wrong with banking, part 1: the legal nature of banking contracts
- Frank Whitson Fetter, Development of British Monetary Orthodoxy 1797 – 1875
- F. A. Hayek, Denationalisation of Money: The Argument Refined
- Gordon Kerr, How To Destroy the British Banking System and Bailing out the Banks – Glaring Evidence of Moral Hazard
- James Tyler, My Journey to Austrianism via the City, Money is not working and How to avoid future encounters with financial meltdown
- Irving Fisher, 100% Money, 1935
By Gordon Kerr, on 15 February 10
BJ’s excellent article today rightly draws comparison between the bailout of Greece and the bailout of Northern Rock.
He makes the excellent point that we should be grateful that the myth of monetary union without federalism is now starkly exposed.
His own shortcoming is that he does not quite understand the seriousness of the banking crisis and therefore his article ends at the crisis point with no solution apparent to the UK’s Greeklike problem, other than the implied debauching of the currency.
Without reform along the simple lines advocated by the Cobden Centre I fear that, even outside the Euro, the banking system may crash again.
By Steven Baker, on 12 February 10
ECONOMISTS IN THE TRADITION OF THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL have shown that one type of maturity mismatching can cause maladjustments and business cycles. When banks expand credit, by granting loans and creating demand deposits, they generate immediately withdrawable liabilities to finance longer-term loans. The newly created demand deposits do not represent a reduction of consumption, i.e., that characterized by real savings. As a consequence, interest rates are artificially reduced under the level they would have been in a free market reflecting real savings and time preference rates. Thus, entrepreneurs are prone to engage in more and longer projects than could be financed with the available supply of real savings. Before all projects that are financed by the credit expansion are finished, a bust occurs. An absence of real savings to sustain the factors of production in the production processes and to produce complementary and necessary capital goods becomes evident. As a result, malinvestments are liquidated and the structure of production is brought in line with consumer preferences again. This is the Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT) in a nutshell.
In his paper, Philipp goes on to explain that other types of maturity mismatching can cause cycles:
At the core of the traditional Austrian business cycle there is maturity mismatching in the term structure of the assets and liabilities of the banking system. In the process that underlies the business cycle, banks use short-term liabilities with zero “maturity” (i.e., demand deposits) to finance long-term projects via longer-term loans. However, the current economic turmoil is marked not only by massive maturity mismatching in the form of fractional reserve banking, but also by maturity mismatching on the part of investment banks via structured investment vehicles (SIVs), that use short-term repurchase agreements or short-term financial papers to finance longer-term investments. Naturally, the following question comes to mind: If one kind of maturity mismatching, i.e., the use of demand deposits to finance loans, can cause the business cycle, would not other kinds of maturity mismatching have similar effects, i.e., the use of funds obtained from the issue of short-term commercial paper to finance longer-term loans.
The full paper is recommended for the technical reader. Available here.
By Toby Baxendale, on 4 February 10
Drawing on the work of Nobel Laureates in economics from three traditions, plus numerous other distinguished scholars, Cobden Centre Chairman, economist and successful entrepreneur Toby Baxendale presents an informal introduction to our proposal for honest money and the benefits consequent on the reform. See also our precis of Irving Fisher’s 100% Money.
Fact
- The average overhang of credit to money of all banks in the United Kingdom is 34 x to its reserves i.e. its actual money base.
- If more than one person in 34 walks into all banks simultaneously to withdraw their deposits, there will be a system wide bank run and a mass liquidity event with systematic default and insolvency.
- We saw the start of this with Northern Rock in the summer of 2007.
- We attempt to paper over the cracks and restore confidence in the banking system still today – with little success.
 Sterling Liquid Assets (BoE FSR, Jun 2009)
A practical, politically-acceptable proposal
Our proposal is, as Irving Fisher wrote, “The opposite of radical”:
- Require 100% cash reserves to be held against all demand deposits; there can never be a crisis if a bank always holds 100% cash against all its demand deposits.
- Parliament can do this with one Act.
A similar Act took place in 1844. The Bank Charter Act or “Peel’s Act” established a 100% reserve requirement for bank notes that were issued claiming to be redeemable in gold. The reality was that there were 23 notes in issue for every one unit of gold at the time, creating instability, “panic” and general economic chaos. Not a too dissimilar situation from today where we have 34 claims on money to one unit of money. Politicians in the 19th century did not see the creation of unbacked credit through accounting entries as a problem, since it was only done on a very small scale. The problem then was rampant note issue (claims to real money) well over and above the monetary base, as this was the preferred method the bankers used at the time.
It is often forgotten but when you place £1m in a savings account (in cash) in say the Royal Bank of Scotland, which has no legal reserve requirement, they then lend £970k (in credit) , keeping on average 3% of cash back in reserves, to an entrepreneur in say HSBC, who then deposits that money in HSBC. We now have one claim to the original £1m and one claim to the £970k. The money supply has moved from £1m to £1.97m – just like magic! This is credit expansion.
The reality is that across all the banks in the United Kingdom licensed by the Bank of England, we have for every £1 of money (in cash), £34 in claims to money (credit)!
Peel’s problem was the over issue of notes to gold: our problem is the over issue of credit to money.
Continue reading “A day of reckoning: how to end the banking crisis now”
By Steven Baker, on 25 January 10
Should banks be permitted to operate with a fractional reserve on demand deposits or should 100% reserves be a legal requirement? Should there be a central bank with a monopoly on note issue? What are the consequences of these choices? These were mainstream questions in the 19th century and they demand attention today. Here, following the ESCP Europe/Cobden Centre “Colloquium on Honest Money”, Steve Baker frames the debate to be had about money and banking.
Today, people are well aware that we have a banking crisis, a “credit crunch“. That is, there is a problem in the financial system, a system which is centrally planned — see Economic Interventionism, Banks and the Crisis – and an approach which necessarily works badly – see Strip the Bank of England of its power. So, what are the features of the present system and what are the alternatives?
The two important features of the present, orthodox system are:
- The banks are not required to keep money in reserve to the value of demand deposits. That is, they operate with a fractional reserve. As Toby Baxendale has pointed out, today if more than one person in 34 asks their bank for their money back in notes and coins, which is a reasonable, contractually-sound request, we will have a systemic banking crisis — a run on all banks — because there is simply not as much cash as people’s bank statements say there is.
- There are, across the world, central banks in which committees of experts set “monetary policy” — see The kindness of geniuses – a rate of interest which, through various mechanisms, affects the entire economy. And the economy is, of course, what people choose to do, since the economy is nothing more or less than the cooperation of thinking, acting individuals and of corporations run by thinking, acting individuals; therefore, manipulating the interest rate necessarily distorts the actions of people and the productive structure. Central banks also act as “lenders of last resort” in the event of a run on a particular bank — which is possible because of their fractional reserve — but in the case of Northern Rock, the Bank of England did not ultimately fulfill that role.
Stepping back from today’s monetary orthodoxy — a fractional reserve and a central bank — the options are plain: we can have a 100% reserve on demand deposits, or not, and separately, we can have central banks with a monopoly on the supply of currency, or not. Hence, Jesús Huerta de Soto models (PDF) the banking debate as follows:
 The shape of the debate (click to enlarge)
As Irving Fisher, one of the founders of Monetarism, pointed out in the sub-title and content of his book 100% Money, there are potential benefits to be gained from moving to another system. For example, Fisher identified the following as the headline benefits of moving to a 100% reserve requirement:
- keeping chequing banks 100% liquid so that there can be no more runs on banks,
- preventing inflation and deflation,
- largely curing or preventing depressions,
- and wiping out much of the National Debt.
Since we have had a run on a bank, since the money supply has deflated, since attempts to reflate the money supply risk price inflation and distort the economy, since the boom-bust cycle is evidently still in progress and since we are doubling our national debt, it is perhaps worth taking seriously the question of how our system of money and banking is organized.
Furthering that discussion was the purpose of the recent ESCP Europe/Cobden Centre Colloquium on Honest Money directed by Founding Fellow Dr Anthony J. Evans, Chaired by Corporate Affairs Director Steve Baker and attended by Chairman Toby Baxendale amongst 9 other academics and practitioners in the field of money and banking.
We will continue to develop and promote a range of ideas to open up and further the debate on money and banking.
Further Reading
- Baxendale, A day of reckoning: how to end the banking crisis now
- Frank Whitson Fetter, Development of British Monetary Orthodoxy 1797 – 1875
- F. A. Hayek, Denationalisation of Money: The Argument Refined
- Huerta de Soto, Money, Bank Credit and Economic Cycles
- Gordon Kerr, How To Destroy the British Banking System and Bailing out the Banks – Glaring Evidence of Moral Hazard
- James Tyler, My Journey to Austrianism via the City, Money is not working and How to avoid future encounters with financial meltdown
- Irving Fisher, 100% Money, 1935
By Steven Baker, on 22 January 10
Today, we publish our brief guide to money and banking.

The Guide comprises:
- Four charts showing how Baxendale and Evans’ measure of the money supply correlates to economic activity whereas the Bank of England’s measures do not,
- How wealth is created,
- What is and is not money,
- What is wrong with the mechanistic Quantity Theory of Money,
- The role of the interest rate in the business cycle,
- How banking has become socialised through legal privilege and taxpayer guarantee,
- The shape of the debate on money and banking.
By Steven Baker, on 12 January 10
Irving Fisher’s “100% Money” is remarkable in the context of our present credit crunch. While The Cobden Centre pursues copyright permission to scan and distribute this book, we offer this summary of the preface, foreword and first chapter, which outline Fisher’s proposal.
100% Money
Designed to keep checking banks 100% liquid; to prevent inflation and deflation; largely to cure or prevent depressions; and to wipe out much of the National Debt.
By
Irving Fisher, LL.D.
Professor Emeritus of Economics
Yale University
Irving Fisher (1867-1947) was an important American neoclassical economist who found his “debt-deflation” analysis of the Great Depression was overlooked in favour of Keynesianism. His theories have made a comeback since the 1980s and several important concepts are named after him. He laid the foundations of monetarism.
Fisher’s “100% Money” proposal was to raise reserve requirements against checking deposits to 100%. That is, to keep money on deposit at the bank safe and ready for withdrawal. This was startling in 1935 but, then as now, it represented a return to ancient principle.
Continue reading “Irving Fisher, 100% Money, 1935″
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