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By Steven Baker MP, on 30 June 09
Via How the ECB’s fig leaf has completely withered away | Anatole Kaletsky: Economic view – Times Online :
Last Wednesday, the European Central Bank injected €442 billion (£377 billion) of new cash into the euro money markets. This was the biggest long-term lending operation in the history of central banking and was equivalent to half the Fed’s entire monetary expansion in the past 18 months. Yet most people still believe that the Fed (along with the Bank of England) is engaged in a “reckless” experiment with inflationary quantitative easing (QE), while the ECB is steadfastly honouring the deflationist traditions of the Bundesbank’s “steady hand”.
By Steven Baker MP, on 30 June 09
Via Lords Hansard text for 5 Feb 200905 Feb 2009 (pt 0003):
My Lords, the Banking Bill which we are currently discussing in the House is very complex and detailed, but it does nothing to resolve the current banking crisis, which lies at the heart of our economic problems. The noble Lord, Lord Peston, has just said that it is the fault of the bankers. I agree with him up to a point, but would go further and say that the fault that really needs correcting is our whole banking system. …
The Banking Bill fails to address the fault which has led to every major banking and currency crisis during the past 200 years, including this one. It merely, lazily and weakly, papers over the cracks. Like Lilliputians, we are trying to tie down Gulliver with ever more strands of rope. It did not work then; it has not worked since 1811; and it will not work now.
… The current crisis, like previous ones, emanated from a base of judicial decisions. Prior to 1811, title to the money in depositors’ accounts belonged to the depositor. However, in that year, decisions in Carr v Carr and, in 1848, Foley v Hill gave legal status to the banking practice of removing depositors’ money from their accounts and lending it to others. Since then, title to depositors’ money has transferred from the depositor to the bank at the moment when the deposit is made.
The noble lord’s entire speech is highly recommended.
See also What is wrong with banking, part 1: the legal nature of banking contracts.
By Steven Baker MP, on 30 June 09
Via China’s banks are an accident waiting to happen to every one of us – Telegraph:
China’s banks are veering out of control. The half-reformed economy of the People’s Republic cannot absorb the $1,000bn (£600bn) blitz of new lending issued since December.
Money is leaking instead into Shanghai’s stock casino, or being used to keep bankrupt builders on life support. It is doing very little to help lift the world economy out of slump
By Steven Baker MP, on 26 June 09
Via British banks highly vulnerable to future shocks, Bank of England warns – Telegraph:
Britain’s banks remain over-indebted, highly vulnerable and harbour growing funding gaps which leave them susceptible to future shocks, the Bank of England has said.
…
In a sign of the strain facing nations’ public finances – including the UK’s – the report also revealed that the threat of a sovereign debt default has become one of the biggest concerns for investors. A survey put together for the report identified sovereign risk as a financial stability concern for the first time.
The report also laid out a number of key criteria banks will have to fulfil in the future – reforms which could transform the structure of the financial system. Among its recommendations were that in future banks should “face a credible threat of closure or wind down”, should have a “risk-based, pre-funded deposit insurance system”, should increase their levels of capital and liquidity, depending on their size, and should provide a “will” which explains how to dismantle them in the event of insolvency.
The Bank of England’s Financial Stability Report is available here.
By Steven Baker MP, on 25 June 09
Via FT.com / Columnists / Martin Wolf – Reform of regulation has to start by altering incentives:
At the heart of the financial industry are highly leveraged businesses. Their central activity is creating and trading assets of uncertain value, while their liabilities are, as we have been reminded, guaranteed by the state. This is a licence to gamble with taxpayers’ money. The mystery is that crises erupt so rarely.
The place to start is with the core of modern capitalism: the limited liability, joint-stock company. Big commercial banks were among the most important products of the limited liability revolution. But banks are special sorts of businesses: for them, debt is more than a means of doing business; it is their business. Thus, limited liability is likely to have an exceptionally big impact on their behaviour.
…
Regulatory reform cannot end with incentives. But it has to start from incentives. A business that is too big to fail cannot be run in the interests of shareholders, since it is no longer part of the market. Either it must be possible to close it down or it has to be run in a different way. It is as simple – and brutal – as that.
By Steven Baker MP, on 20 June 09
Via Speech by MERVYN KING GOVERNOR OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND:
We need to reflect more deeply on the nature of the failures before designing a regulatory response – after all many financial markets continued to function well. But banks entered the crisis with historically low levels of liquid assets, and inadequate levels of capital with which to absorb losses. Moreover, in the United Kingdom, the financial sector became too big and too highly leveraged. …
As far as individual banks are concerned, we face some uncomfortable choices about the structure and regulation of our banking sector. If some banks are thought to be too big to fail, then, in the words of a distinguished American economist, they are too big. It is not sensible to allow large banks to combine high street retail banking with risky investment banking or funding strategies, and then provide an implicit state guarantee against failure. Something must give. …
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There is no support in this country, and no case, for excessively bureaucratic regulation. But change to the structure, regulation and indeed culture of our banking system is necessary. Blaming individuals is no substitute for acknowledging the failure of a system, of a certain type of banking. We have a real opportunity now to put that right, and regain the trust that has been lost.
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