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By David Howden, on 15 November 11
One can read The Daily Mail for its coverage of the royal family, snapshots of British life, or, if you are like me, the headlines. On Saturday, guest contributor Ian Morris, Professor of History and Classics at Stanford University, served up this classic example:
The perils of the begging bowl: Exactly 100 years ago China was ‘rescued’ by European loans. The result was a century of misery. Now the boot is on the other foot.
Morris continues to explain that 100 years ago, in 1911, the last emperor of China had just been toppled. The newly formed Republic of China was penniless (yuanless?), and desperate for loans to keep it afloat. European investors, flush with cash in what was the still prosperous pre-World War I era, flocked to Beijing to make loans to keep the newborn country afloat.
Today the eastward journey continues, but it is not made by Europeans looking to invest their savings. It is instead European politicians looking to secure loans to keep their unsustainable experiments afloat for a little while longer. While this great European experiment with the welfare state is now obviously insolvent, an attitude remains that we are only in the midst of a liquidity crisis. This view is wrong. No amount of loans can save a country from a crisis of insolvency, as has proven to be the case in Greece recently.
A more important question to ask is whether Europeans should be seeking bailouts to keep the current system afloat.
The Republic of China, formed in 1912 supported by European funds gave way to The People’s Republic of China in 1949. The latter demonstrated itself to be the most despotic regime of the twentieth century. The impoverishment of citizens by other regimes, Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia, pale in comparison to the hardships endured by the hardworking Chinese over the last century.
Several centuries ago, China was the most prosperous nation on Earth, far exceeding even Europe in terms of wealth and technology. The Industrial Revolution changed this, but China still managed to maintain its competiveness, particularly by trading with the newly arriving European entrepreneurs as shipping improvements made trade between the continents increasingly possible during the 19th century.
The loss of the Emperor in 1911 set in motion the key steps that would place the nation’s future in the hands of its eventual tyrant leader, Chairman Mao. Funds provided by wealthy European investors fomented this shift, allowing freshly flailing regimes to secure a political foothold in the late teens and early 1920s.
One must ask, with the fortune of hindsight, whether such financing was beneficial. Fostering what would later become a tyrannically regime must surely be viewed with less than rose-coloured glasses today.
The European states may not seem tyrannical in comparison to China. The point is that they are examples of countries with failed policies. One must ask if searching for ways to continue these erroneous policies is beneficial for the Europeans that must live with them. Europeans with an eye for history need only look at a similar policy pursued 100 years ago for the answer.
By Steven Baker MP, on 1 January 11
 The following is Jesús Huerta de Soto’s foreword to The Tragedy of the Euro by Philipp Bagus, a friend of The Cobden Centre. You can buy or download the book here. Philipp Bagus is a professor of economics at Universidad Rey Juan Carlos in Madrid.
It is a great pleasure for me to present this book by my colleague Philipp Bagus, one of my most brilliant and promising students. The book is extremely timely and shows how the interventionist setup of the European Monetary system has led to disaster.
The current sovereign debt crisis is the direct result of credit ex- pansion by the European banking system. In the early 2000′s, credit was expanded especially in the periphery of the European Monetary Union such as in Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and Spain. Interest rates were reduced substantially by credit expansion coupled with a fall both in inflationary expectations and risk premiums. The sharp fall in inflationary expectations was caused by the prestige of the newly created European Central Bank as a copy of the Bundesbank. Risk premiums were reduced artificially due to the expected support by stronger nations. The result was an artificial boom. Asset price bubbles such as a housing bubble in Spain developed. The newly created money was primarily injected in the countries of the periphery where it financed overconsumption and malinvestments, mainly in an overextended automobile and construction sector. At the same time, the credit expansion also helped to finance and expand unsustainable welfare states.
In 2007, the microeconomic effects that reverse any artificial boom financed by credit expansion and not by genuine real savings started to show up. Prices of means of production such as commodities and wages rose. Interest rates also climbed due to inflationary pressure that made central banks reduce their expansionary stands.
Finally, consumer goods prices started to rise relative to the prices offered to the originary factors of productions. It became more and more obvious that many investments were not sustainable due to a lack of real savings. Many of these investments occurred in the construction sector. The financial sector came under pressure as mortgages had been securitized, ending up directly or indirectly on balance sheets of financial institutions. The pressures culminated in the collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers, which led to a full-fledged panic in financial markets.
Instead of leading market forces run their course, governments unfortunately intervened with the necessary adjustment process. It is this unfortunate intervention that not only prevented a faster and more thorough recovery, but also produced, as a side effect, the sovereign debt crisis of spring 2010. Governments tried to prop up the overextended sectors, increasing their spending. They paid subsidies for new car purchases to support the automobile industry and started public works to support the construction sector as well as the sector that had lent to these industries, the banking sector. Moreover, governments supported the financial sector directly by giving guarantees on their liabilities, nationalizing banks, buying their assets or partial stakes in them. At the same time, unemployment soared due to regulated labor markets. Governments’ revenues out of income taxes and social security plummeted. Expenditures for unemployment subsidies increased. Corporate taxes that had been inflated artificially in sectors like banking, construction, and car manufacturing during the boom were almost completely wiped out. With falling revenues and increasing expenditures governments’ deficits and debts soared, as a direct consequence of governments’ responses to the crisis caused by a boom that was not sustained by real savings.
The case of Spain is paradigmatic. The Spanish government subsidized the car industry, the construction sector, and the bank- ing industry, which had been expanding heavily during the credit expansion of the boom. At the same time a very inflexible labor market caused official unemployment rates to rise to twenty percent. The resulting public deficit began to frighten markets and fellow EU member states, which finally pressured the government to announce some timid austerity measures in order to be able to keep borrowing.
In this regard, the single currency showed one of its “advantages.” Without the Euro, the Spanish government would have most certainly devalued its currency as it did in 1993, printing money to reduce its deficit. This would have implied a revolution in the price structure and an immediate impoverishment of the Spanish population as import prices would have soared. Furthermore, by devaluing, the government could have continued its spending without any structural reforms. With the Euro, the Spanish (or any other troubled government) cannot devalue or print its currency directly to pay off its debt. Now these governments had to engage in austerity measures and some structural reforms after pressure by the Commission and member states like Germany. Thus, it is possible that the second scenario for the future as mentioned by Philipp Bagus in the present book will play out. The Stability and Growth Pact might be reformed and enforced. As a consequence, the governments of the European Monetary Union would have to continue and intensify their austerity measures and structural reforms in order to comply with the Stability and Growth Pact. Pressured by conservative countries like Germany, all of the European Monetary Union would follow the path of traditional crisis policies with spending cuts.
In contrast to the EMU, the United States follows the Keynesian recipe for recessions. In the Keynesian view, during a crisis the government has to substitute a fall in “aggregate demand” by increasing its spending. Thus, the US engages in deficit spending and extremely expansive monetary policies to “jump start” the economy. Maybe one of the beneficial effects of the Euro has been to push all of the EMU toward the path of austerity. In fact, I have argued before that the single currency is a step in the right direction as it fixes exchange rates in Europe and thereby ends monetary nationalism and the chaos of flexible fiat exchange rates manipulated by governments, especially, in times of crisis.
My dear colleague Philipp Bagus has challenged me on my rather positive view on the Euro from the time when he was a student in my class, pointing correctly to the advantages of currency competition. His book, The Tragedy of the Euro, may be read as an elaborated exposition of his arguments against the Euro. While the single currency does away with monetary nationalism in Europe from a theoretical point of view, the question is: just how stable is the single currency in actuality? Bagus deals with this question from two angles, providing at the same time the two main achievements and contributions of the book: a historical analysis of the origins of the Euro and a theoretical analysis of the workings and mechanisms of the Eurosystem. Both analyses point in the same direction. In the historical analysis, Bagus deals with the origins of the Euro and the ECB. He uncovers the interests of national governments, politicians and bankers in a similar way that Rothbard does in relation to the origin of the Federal Reserve System in The Case against the Fed. In fact, the book could also have been analogously titled The Case against the ECB. Considering the political interests, dynamics and circumstances that led to the introduction of the Euro, it becomes clear that the Euro might in fact be a step in the wrong direction; a step towards a pan-European inflationary fiat currency aimed to push aside limits that competition and the conservative monetary policy of the Bundesbank had imposed before. Bagus’s theoretical analysis makes the inflationary purpose and setup of the Eurosystem even clearer. The Eurosystem is unmasked as a self-destroying system that leads to massive redistribution across the EMU, with incentives for governments to use the ECB as a device to finance their deficits. He shows that the concept of the Tragedy of the Commons, which I have applied to the case of fractional reserve banking, is also applicable to the Eurosystem, where different Euro- pean governments can exploit the value of the single currency.
I am glad that this book is being made available to the public by the Mises Institute. The future of Europe and the world depends on the understanding of the monetary theory and the workings of monetary institutions. This book provides strong tools toward understanding the history of the Euro and its perverse institutional setup. Hopefully, it can help to turn the tide toward a sound monetary system in Europe and worldwide.
Today, Estonia adopted the Euro.
Copyright © 2010 by the Ludwig von Mises Institute. Published under the Creative Commons Attribution License 3.0: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
By Steven Baker MP, on 27 November 10
 Via Note from Her Majesty’s Treasury on EMU (Novembre 1989):
The European Council agreed at its meeting in Madrid in June to launch the first Stage of economic and monetary union (EMU) on 1 July 1990. The Council also confirmed the objective of the progressive realisation of EMU but did not specify how that objective was to be realised. By common consent the next steps in economic and monetary integration of the twelve Member States will be crucial to the future economic development of the European Community. That development must be based on firm and durable foundations which reflect both the diversity and the unity of the economic and monetary situation in the Community. This paper suggests how such sound foundations should be laid in a way which avoids the pitfalls of other approaches now under consideration.
Follow the link above for details of how Britain thought competing European currencies would have been a better alternative to Delors’ Euro: competition would have made money honest.
It’s a fascinating read which lays aside the notion that competing currencies are far beyond the mainstream. What a pity this plan wasn’t enacted.
And a grateful hat-tip to Michael Fallon MP, who brought the existence of this paper to my attention.
See also Denationalisation of Money: The Argument Refined.
By Jamie Whyte, on 1 April 10
In 2006, the European Court of Justice ruled that the Department of Trade and Industry has misinterpreted clauses 3 and 5 of the Working Time Directive. Clause 3 states: “Member states shall take the measures necessary to ensure that every worker is entitled to a minimum daily rest period of 11 consecutive hours per 24-hour period”. Clause 5 says that workers are additionally entitled to at least one uninterrupted rest period of 24 hours every week.
The tricky word here is “entitled”. The DTI interpreted it to mean entitled. They instructed employers that they must allow, but need not require, employees to take these rest periods. According to the ECJ, however, “entitled” actually means obliged. Employees may not choose to take shorter rest periods, and employers must not give them this option.
The European judges are surely correct on the matter of interpretation. If the words of European legislators are open to several interpretations, then deciding which was intended is simple; it must be the one that most restricts freedom of choice. And if you think that obliged is not a possible interpretation of “entitled”, then there is much you could learn from the judiciary about post-modern semiotics.
If not surprising, the ruling may still seem unfortunate. British employees already enjoyed the right to these rest periods. When it suited them, however, they were free to take shorter breaks – perhaps to earn overtime or to negotiate a longer break for another occasion. This option was surely valuable to them. Why should the manufacturing union Amicus have asked the ECJ to eliminate it? And why should the TUC have welcomed the ECJ’s ruling?
To see why, note that in the labour market employees are the suppliers and employers are the consumers. Employers buy the labour offered for sale by workers. The Working Time Directive, as now interpreted, is a regulation about the kind of service workers may offer for sale.
Product regulations usually impose minimum standards. When it comes to labour, however, we get maximum standards. The ECJ’s ruling means that, with respect to the flexibility of hours worked, employees may not offer a product exceeding a certain quality. And that is precisely why unions support this interpretation. Maximum standard regulations are required by suppliers attempting to fix their prices above the market price.
Consider a different example. Suppose you manufactured a basic type of bicycle. If the most efficient bike-maker could produce such a bike at a cost of £100, then this would soon be its market price. In a free market, price competition between suppliers drives the price of goods down to the cost of producing them. This is nice for consumers but not for suppliers. How might you avoid this unpleasant consequence of competition?
You could try collusion. Create the British Association of Bike-Makers and, at your annual conference, agree that no one will sell bikes for less than £200. Or lobby the government to set a minimum bicycle price of £200.
Alas, a minimum price will not work on its own, because it does not stop competition on quality. If everyone must sell bikes at £200, and my competitors’ bikes are worth £100, then I can get an advantage by producing better bikes at a cost of £110. My competitors will then retaliate with a yet better bike that costs £120 to make. This process will continue until we are all making bikes at a cost of £200, and none of us is better off than when they cost £100. To keep the benefits of our minimum price, we also need to restrict the quality of the bikes on sale: we need maximum standards.
Trade unionists and employment regulators are devoted to keeping the price of labour higher than its market value. So they must also stop the suppliers of labour from competing on quality. The endeavour is corrupt in principle – indeed, it would be illegal if the product were anything except labour – and futile in practice. The legislation they favour does not eliminate competition between workers; it simply benefits some at the expense of others.
I recently managed a team of two consultants. They were of roughly equal value. John was brighter but Don worked harder, often violating the Working Time Directive. If I had stopped him, who would have benefited? Not Don. He would have been robbed of his ability to compete with John, and his chance of promotion would have been reduced. A ban on hard work benefits not those who work “too hard” but those with other qualities to offer. It rigs the competition in their favour.
It is impossible to eliminate competition between the suppliers of labour. Rule it out in one respect, such as effort, and it will merely shift to something else, such as talent. Rule it out in all economically relevant respects – allow no price or quality competition – and it will shift onto irrelevant preferences of the employer. A bigot might employ foreigners if they came at a discount. But why would he otherwise? Immigrants do better in America than in France, not because Americans are less racist, but because their labour market is less regulated.
Labour laws are intended to protect employees from employers. But no such protection is needed. Feudalism ended long ago, and the labour market is not a monopsony (a market with only one buyer). No one is forced into any particular job. Indeed, unemployment benefits mean that no one need work at all. Labour laws merely distort the allocation of labour and arbitrarily bestow costs and benefits across the population. They should not be interpreted more stringently; they should be repealed.
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